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Operational Risk and Reputation in Financial Institutions: Does Media Tone Make a 
Difference? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Operational risk announcements are unexpected adverse media news that potentially harm the 
reputation of financial institutions. This paper examines the equity-based and debt-based reputational 
effects of financial sentiment tones in operational risk announcements and shows how such reputational 
effects are moderated by alternative sources of public information. Our analysis reveals that the net 
negative tone and litigious tone have adverse reputational effects, and the uncertainty tone mitigates the 
adverse reputational impact. Additionally, alternative, simultaneous sources of information neutralize 
the reputational effects of textual tones. First, third-party information about the event (i.e. regulatory 
announcements and final settlements) dissolves the favorable (adverse) reputational impact of the 
uncertainty tone (litigious tone). Second, loss amount disclosure and firm recognition substitute the 
reputational effects of the net negative tone and uncertainty tone only in Anglo-Saxon countries and 
market-based economies. Overall, our findings indicate that the reputational effects of the media 
materialize most when there is lack of certain, quantifiable and regulated public information about the 
operational risk event. 
 
Keywords: Content Analysis, Financial Sentiment, Media News, Operational Risk, Reputational Risk, 
Textual Tone 
JEL Classifications: D8 Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty, G1 General Financial Markets, G2 
Financial Institutions and Services 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, a number of high-scale operational losses have hit large financial 
institutions all over the world, leading to severe financial disturbances including the collapse of some 
institutions. For example, UBS Investment Bank lost $2bn in 2011 when a trader entered false 
information into the trade booking system in order to hide risky trades without breaching trading 
thresholds for over three years. This pattern of deception led to the largest unauthorized trading losses 
in British history, albeit it had followed in the footsteps of similar incidents such as the rogue trading 
loss of €4.9bn uncovered by Société Générale in 2008. In terms of the business consequences of 
operational losses, one of the worst examples is the unauthorized speculative trading loss of £827million 
(approximately $1.3bn) by Nick Lesson to Barings Bank during the period 1992-1995. Although small 
in comparison to more recent operational risk losses it caused the United Kingdom's then oldest 
investment bank to collapse due to its inability to absorb such losses. In light of these high-profile 
scandals, operational risk management and disclosure practices in financial institutions have recently 
attracted increased attention from academics, professionals, and regulators (e.g. BCBS, 1998, 2001; 
Helbok and Wagner, 2006; Ford et al., 2009). Moreover, the inception of the Basel II Capital Accord 
(BCBS, 2006b) required banks to reserve regulatory capital against operational risk1 exposure in 
addition to those reserved against exposures of market and credit risk. 
Financial firms are subject to reputational risk2 as a result of the announcements related to these 
operational risk events, which ultimately encompass elements of ‘poor internal controls’ as posited by 
Chava et al. (2017, p. 2) when investigating the effects of misreporting on borrower reputation. The 
BCBS definition of operational risk (BCBS, 2006b) and the evidence provided by the literature (e.g. 
Cummins et al., 2006; Chernobai et al., 2011; Wang and Hsu, 2013) show that operational risk event 
announcements3 reveal serious problems in internal control systems, behavior of management and 
employees, and ultimately weak corporate governance mechanisms in financial firms. These problems 
uncovered in the announcements have important ramifications for investors as they indicate information 
that could potentially affect their expected return and variance (Markowitz, 1952), whilst allowing for 
investors to perceive their potential risk exposure to the event itself by taking into consideration the 
levels of ‘controllability’ the institution has at its disposal to limit exposure (March and Shapira, 1987; 
Slovic, 1987; Weber and Milliman, 1997). 
                                                          
1 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, p.144) defines 
operational risk as “…the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems 
or from external events. This definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk.” 
2 Detailed review of previous research and regulatory perspectives on reputational risk in financial institutions is 
provided in Section 2.1.  
3 We use the terms “operational risk event announcements” and “operational risk announcements” 
interchangeably to refer to online news articles disclosing information on operational risk events incurred by 
financial institutions. 
2 
 
 
To the best of our knowledge, no previous paper on operational and reputational risks has examined 
the market-based effects of narrative contents in operational risk announcements. Operational risk 
announcements are pieces of adverse news which unexpectedly hit the media headlines revealing new 
information on deficiencies in corporate governance structures, internal control systems, and risk 
management practices in financial institutions. Much of the previous research has studied media effects 
accompanying corporate earnings announcements albeit the empirical evidence documented was 
mixed. While some studies proved that media coverage and contents drive the financial sentiment 
(Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008), stock returns (Fang and Peress, 2009; Ahmad et al, 2016), and 
local trading (Engelberg and Parsons, 2011), other studies have documented the media hype and bias 
especially towards local firm announcements (Gurun and Butler, 2012). This mixed evidence calls for 
further investigation into the role of different types of media (e.g. newswire services, TV, internet search 
engines, social media etc.) in influencing the financial sentiments of investors and driving the reactions 
of equity, debt, and CDS markets to different types of announcements. In this paper, we examine 
empirically the market-based reputational effects of financial sentiment tones in operational risk 
announcements extracted from newswire services. 
The recent decision of ‘The Independent’ newspaper to discontinue its print edition and continue 
only as an online service is another early manifestation of a publication trend which is expected to 
prevail throughout the media news services in the years to come. More focus is being given to online 
newswire services and less attention is given to hardcopy newspapers (Saperstein, 2014). This attitude 
is expected to be stronger for financial markets’ investors because they can find the required information 
on business news in a timelier and less costly manner than hardcopy newspapers. Moreover, we argue 
that this attitude is expected to be amplified around unexpected, adverse news announcements hitting 
the financial industry as a major pillar in the economic stability of any country. Given the importance 
and relevance of newswire services, we aim to empirically investigate and document evidence on the 
reputational contribution of the textual contents in media news on operational risk events recently 
announced in a global sample of financial institutions. 
To achieve the aim of this paper, we utilize a global sample of 305 operational risk event 
announcements from 90 financial institutions in 18 countries, which hit the public media news 
following the global financial crisis (2010 - 2014). We then perform a content analysis of textual 
information disclosed in the first operational risk announcements using the financial sentiment 
dictionary recently developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011)4. More specifically, we measure the 
financial sentiment tones across four dimensions, which are: negative words, positive words, 
uncertainty words, and litigious words. We include the uncertainty tone and litigious tone due to the 
                                                          
4 We use the most recently updated version of Loughran and McDonald dictionary in 2014:  
http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists_files/LoughranMcDonald_MasterDictionary_2014.xlsx. 
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high degree of ambiguity and considerable litigation risks known to be associated with operational risk 
events. On the one hand, ambiguity is usually very high when the exact or estimated operational loss 
amount is not disclosed, or not mentioned as settled, in the first announcement, or when the operational 
risk event is neither recognized by the loss firm5 nor announced by a regulatory body (e.g. the SEC in 
the USA or FCA in the UK). On the other hand, litigation risks are more significant when operational 
risk announcements mention on-going or forthcoming legal lawsuits or regulatory sanctions. We argue 
that this intensive degree of loss severity, ambiguity, and litigation risk represents a unique opportunity 
to examine how the narrative contents in media news drive the behaviors of different types of investors, 
thus possibly causing reputational damage to financial institutions. 
Our paper adds several original contributions to the extant literature on operational risk, reputational 
risk, and media coverage. First, this is the first paper to examine the incremental reputational effects of 
textual information in operational risk announcements. This adds value to the findings of previous 
relevant papers that have examined only the impact of quantitative information disclosed in operational 
risk announcements (i.e. absolute loss amount or its ratio to market capitalization). Second, this is the 
first paper to quantify the reputational effects of textual contents in newswires services in an 
increasingly out-of-print media world. The paper exploits the unique nature of operational risk 
announcements well known to cause different degrees of reputational damage to pinpoint the 
association between online media contents and reputational risk. Third, this is the first paper to study 
operational risk announcements and relevant reputational risk in an entirely post-GFC setting, thus 
providing updated evidence in this area. The global financial crisis and recent rapid developments in 
banking regulations (such as Basel III and its anticipated full implementation in 2018) and insurance 
regulations (such as Solvency II which has come into full effect in 2016) call for updating the empirical 
evidence to uncover whether the attitudes of the investing community towards operational and 
reputational risks have seen any technical or behavioral shifts. Fourth, this is one of the early papers to 
use the ORIC6 database (which is actually used by its member institutions to provide external loss event 
data when calculating their operational risk capital requirements) to extract and examine the market-
based consequences of operational risk announcements in financial institutions. Finally, this is the first 
paper to examine empirically the reactions of both equity and CDS markets to operational risk 
announcements and draw beneficial inferences on simultaneous behaviors of potential shareholders and 
creditors. Previous studies have separately examined investor’s behavior around operational risk 
announcements either in ‘equity-based’ markets (e.g. Perry and de Fontnouvelle, 2005; Cummins et al., 
                                                          
5 We use the term “loss firm” to indicate the loss-making firm, that is, the financial institution which incurred the 
announced operational risk event. 
6 ORIC stands for Operational Risk International Consortium: https://www.oricinternational.com/. 
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2006; Gillet et al., 2010; Sturm 2013a) or ‘debt-related’ markets (e.g. Plunus et al., 2012; Sturm, 2013b) 
but never together.   
We believe that the five contributions mentioned above could inform policymakers, regulators, and 
market participants as to the importance of developing innovative mechanisms to mitigate the 
reputational effects of operational risk losses.  Given the results presented in this study, the development 
of media task forces to follow, analyze, and respond to adverse news announcements, which could have 
disastrous consequences on big financial institutions, or destabilize the whole financial industry should 
be considered. Moreover, the findings of this paper could advise risk managers, executive officers, and 
board directors in financial institutions on the importance of establishing and utilizing early warning 
systems in the form of content analysis software and information processing models (Kremer et al., 
2013). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a review of the literature and 
develops our research hypotheses. Section 3 provides the details of our research methodology. Section 
4 presents and discusses our empirical results and robustness checks. Concluding remarks are 
mentioned in Section 5.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
2.1. Reputational Risk in Financial Institutions: Previous Research and Regulatory Framework  
The reputation of organizations can offer a significant competitive advantage for them (Gatzert, 
2015), as it facilitates raising capital (Fombrun et al., 2000), assists in stakeholder negotiations, alliance 
building, and contracts (Fombrun and van Riel, 2004; Rhee and Valdez, 2009; Van Den Bogaerd and 
Aerts, 2015; Eckert, 2017) and is considered a strategic intangible asset (Hall, 1992). These positive 
benefits of good corporate reputation are linked to the fact that external stakeholders and observers form 
opinions, beliefs and impressions of an organization (Rindova et al., 2010), that can ultimately affect 
stakeholder decision making and improve competitiveness (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Soana, 2016). 
However, a good reputation can be associated with a higher reputational risk (i.e. superior abnormal 
returns in good times such as CEOs receiving a prestigious certification (Wade et al., 2006) and more 
severe reputational damage in the wake of bad news such as product recalls due to a greater stakeholder 
disappointment (Rhee and Haunschild, 2006). Hence, in response to the continuously increasing 
importance of reputational risk in the modern business environment, several international insurance 
companies have started to offer stand-alone reputational risk insurance policies (Gatzert, Schmit and 
Kolb, 2016). 
The intrinsic link between operational risk events and reputational risk has been highlighted by 
Sturm (2013a) and the European Banking Authority given that “most operational risks have a strong 
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impact in terms of reputation” (EBA, 2014, p. 93). This is further accentuated by the ability of social 
media platforms and the internet to provide quick access to information for stakeholders in a relatively 
unfiltered manner, whilst allowing them to interact with each other in a way that spreads information 
further and faster than traditional print media (Aula, 2010; Gatzert, 2015; Heidinger and Gatzert, 2018).  
It is therefore not surprising that regulators both in the banking and insurance sectors are now paying 
much closer attention to reputational risk given the importance of trust, and the confidence that it 
inspires in stakeholders on both sides of the balance sheet within these industries, to ensuring the safety 
and soundness of financial systems (Fiordelsi et al., 2013; Soana, 2016; Heidinger and Gatzert, 2018). 
This has been recognized recently in the Solvency II Regulatory Directive (2009/44) governing 
insurance companies in which reputation risk is defined as:  
“the risk of potential loss to an undertaking through deterioration of its reputation or standing due 
to a negative perception of the undertaking’s image among customers, counterparties, shareholders 
and/or supervisory authorities. To that extent it may be regarded as less of a separate risk, than one 
consequent on the overall conduct of an undertaking.” (CEIOPS, 2009, p. 42). 
The sentiments of this definition are also reflected in the Basel II capital requirements directive and 
also the European Banking Authority (2014, p. 100) who highlight that “By nature, reputational risk is 
more relevant for large institutions, in particular those with listed equities or debts or those that operate 
in interbank markets”. Although neither the Solvency II nor Basel regulations pertaining to capital 
allocations (e.g. CRD IV) implicitly require institutions to hold capital in relation to their reputational 
risk exposure directly, they are expected to consider the consequences of a drop in reputation into their 
scenarios for funding models specific to ILAAP and ICAAP. For example, the Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (PRA) in the UK expects banks to take account of the detrimental effects reputational risk 
would have on both capital and liquidity inadequacies when running scenarios to calculate their PRA 
Capital buffer – an amount of capital banks must hold over and above the requirements of CRD IV 
pillar 2, to cover losses that may arise under a severe stress scenario (PRA, 2017, p. 36). This in turn 
has placed a greater onus on boards of directors and senior managers to include the management of 
reputational risk into their policies and procedures and improve the overall risk management framework 
of their institution given that it is a consequence of their (poor) internal risk management process 
(BCBS, 2009). 
Previous research within financial services has also found consistent evidence of the adverse 
reputational effects of large operational risk event announcements in the financial industry as reflected 
by a drop in the market values of loss firms by more than a one-to-one proportion7 (Perry and de 
                                                          
7 For example, suppose the market value of a firm dropped as a result of an announcement of an operational risk 
event. Then, a drop in the market value of three-to-one means that the magnitude of the market value drop is three 
times the magnitude of the operational loss. 
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Fontnouvelle, 2005; Cummins et al., 2006; Gillet et al., 2010; Sturm, 2013a; Fiordelisi et al., 2014).  
More specifically, Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005) have studied 115 operational loss announcements 
in a global banking sample during the period 1974 – 2004 and documented a negative equity-based 
reputational impact only for internal fraud announcements. In addition, Cummins et al. (2006) have 
inspected 492 operational loss announcements in a sample of U.S. financial institutions comprising 403 
banks and 89 insurers during the period 1978 – 2003 and documented a more negative equity market 
reaction in the insurance industry (possibly due to less operational risk regulation than in the banking 
industry) and for firms with higher growth potentials. Moreover, Micocci et al. (2009) have estimated 
what they call “reputational value-at-risk” by analyzing the negative equity market reactions to 20 fraud 
announcements exceeding $20 million in U.S. and European financial institutions during the period 
2000 – 2006. Furthermore, Fiordelisi et al. (2014) have utilized a comprehensive sample of 430 
operational loss announcements in 163 commercial and investment banks in the USA and Europe during 
the period 1994 – 2008 and documented a more adverse equity-based reputational impact of fraudulent 
events, events incurred in the ‘Payment and Settlement’ and ‘Trading and Sales’ business lines and 
events announced in Europe. 
In their study of 71 operational risk losses in 41 U.S. financial companies between 1994 - 2006, 
Plunus et al. (2012) have documented the adverse impact of operational risk announcements on the first 
announcement date and firm recognition date on cumulative abnormal bond returns and interpret their 
results as ‘pure’ reputational damage since operational risk losses usually do not deplete shareholders’ 
equity and therefore should not be directly relevant to the behavior of debt investors. In agreement with 
Gillet et al. (2010) who have investigated the equity-based reputational effects of 152 operational loss 
announcements in 64 U.S. and 49 European financial institutions between 1994 and 2006, but 
disagreement with Sturm (2013a) results on the stock returns of 136 operational risk losses in European 
financial institutions between 2000 - 2009, Plunus et al. (2012) have found that debt markets react 
favorably to settlement announcements. Sturm (2013b) has inspected the impact of 99 operational risk 
announcements between 2004 - 2010 in the European banking industry on credit default swap (CDS) 
markets and found that abnormal CDS spreads increase only around settlement announcements and 
when the relative operational loss size is higher. These results suggested that some of the characteristics 
and timings of operational risk announcements can cause an increase in the bank’s default risk. We also 
believe that these results (Sturm, 2013b) confirm the existence of ‘pure’ debt-based reputational damage 
caused by operational risk announcements whilst all of the results above confirm the importance of 
understanding operational risk events in relation to reputation risk for debt and equity markets as 
outlined by the EBA (2014, p. 100). 
Fiordelisi et al. (2013) have studied the firm-specific, event-related, and macro determinants of 
reputational damage resulting from 215 operational risk announcements in 163 European and U.S. 
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banks during the period 2003 – 2008. They found that the probability of reputational damage is 
positively associated with bank’s profitability and size, and negatively associated with its capital 
adequacy and growth potentials. In a relevant research stream, Biell and Muller (2013) have examined 
the timings and durations of equity market reactions to 279 operational risk announcements in European 
financial institutions during the period 1974 – 2009 and found that the reputational damage (as measured 
by the absolute ratio of cumulative abnormal stock returns to the operational loss amount disclosed) 
starts earlier and accumulates faster for internal fraud events when compared to External Fraud (EF) 
and Clients, Products, and Business Practices events (CPBP)8. They have also shown that reputational 
damage occurs later when the firm suffering the loss has a higher credit rating and that the extent of 
reputational damage is positively associated with the duration of market’s overreactions to the 
announcements. 
Overall, there is no conclusive evidence in the literature on the exact determinants of reputational 
risk around operational risk announcements in the financial industry. Hence, we posit a new factor that 
can be considered in this context which is media tones and their interactions with alternative sources of 
public information addressing the operational risk event. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
In this section, we develop our research hypotheses regarding the equity-based and debt-based 
reputational effects of media tones in operational risk event announcements and how these effects are 
moderated by alternative sources of public information. 
2.2.1. The Net Negative Tone 
Previous studies have documented that stock returns are negatively associated with the negative tone 
in media news (Tetlock, 2007; Ahmad et al., 2016), 10-k filings (Loughran and McDonald, 2011), 
earnings announcements (Demers and Vega, 2014), and analyst reports (Huang et al., 2014). However, 
several studies (e.g. Tetlock, 2007; Engelberg, 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2015) have shown that 
the positive tone is not priced in equity markets, possibly because equity investors view positive words 
as merely ‘cheap talk’. 
As the number of negative words is expected to largely exceed positive words in ‘adverse’ 
operational risk announcements, we decided to focus our investigations on the net negative tone (i.e. 
negative words minus positive words standardized by the total number of financial sentimental words) 
in these announcements. Journalists, news agents and media experts (we group them together as ‘media 
channels’) get access to both public and private sources of information which they are willing to disclose 
                                                          
8 As defined by the Basel II loss event categories. 
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to their different audiences (obviously including investors) through newswire services. Therefore, we 
expect that media channels will tend to reveal the current or expected severity of the operational risk 
event through the net negative tone used in the first news announcement. To the extent that the markets 
are efficient, the media transmission channels are free from noise, and the investors are willing to 
believe the media. Therefore, we expect investors to interpret the net negative tone as an indicator of 
the unexpected adverse impact of the operational risk event on future cash flows and default risk of the 
loss firm causing an abnormal drop in stock prices and an abnormal boost in CDS spreads following 
the operational risk announcements. Therefore, we formulate our first research hypothesis as follows: 
H1: The net negative tone in operational risk event announcements is negatively associated with 
loss-adjusted abnormal stock returns and positively associated with abnormal CDS spreads following 
the announcements. 
 
2.2.2. The Uncertainty Tone 
Previous papers have found that the uncertainty tone in different types of business communication 
is negatively associated with stock returns and positively associated with stock return volatility (Demers 
and Vega, 2014; Loughran and McDonald, 2011). These findings indicate that uncertainty words are 
interpreted by investors as revealing a higher degree of distrust in the firm-specific distributions of 
future cash flows and earnings, which ultimately manifests itself in higher discount rates and greater 
volatilities. 
However, we argue here that media channels are expected to reveal the degree of ambiguity they 
know to be associated with the operational risk event through the uncertainty tone in the first news 
announcement. Ambiguity associated with the operational risk event on its announcement date could 
come from several sources; i.e. the operational loss amount is unknown either exactly or approximately, 
the firm has not yet recognized an internal fraud (e.g. embezzlement) or external fraud (hacking 
damage), there is no simultaneous regulatory announcement which clarifies more detailed information 
on the event from an independent government agency, or there is no final in-court or out-of-court 
settlement announced. The reputational impact of ambiguity/uncertainty tone on markets could have 
one of two potential consequences (apart from the ‘Cheap Talk’ theory which posits that, under certain 
circumstances, investors fully discount media news and consider it as merely hype thus supporting the 
status-quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988)). The first consequence is that higher ambiguity 
reflected in an amplified uncertainty tone would reduce investors’ trust in the reliability of future cash 
flows and increase their downside suspicions about the long-term default risk of the loss firm. This 
outcome has been supported by empirical evidence in previous studies (Demers and Vega, 2014; 
Loughran and McDonald, 2011). The second potential consequence is that investors could give the loss 
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firms the benefit of the doubt in the case of high uncertainty and therefore could be conditionally 
optimistic that the consequences of the operational risk event might not be as bad as initially suggested 
by the first news announcement as the institution begins to implement ‘controllability’ of the exposure. 
This latter outcome could be more suitable for the nature of operational risk announcements; i.e. 
investors interpret uncertain bad news as good news. Therefore, we formulate our second research 
hypothesis using the second suggested consequence as follows: 
H2: The uncertainty tone in operational risk event announcements is positively associated with loss-
adjusted abnormal stock returns and negatively associated with abnormal CDS spreads following the 
announcements. 
 
2.2.3. The Litigious Tone 
The litigious tone in operational risk announcements is likely to be utilized by media channels in 
disclosing the level of litigation risk they believe to be associated with the operational risk event. In the 
case of first news announcements on operational risk events, litigation risk could imply both upside and 
downside potentials. For example, when an employee or group of employees are suing a bank over 
allegations of employer malpractice, it might not be that clear on the first announcement date whether 
the bank will lose or win this forthcoming legal case. Hence, the litigious tone could reveal either upside 
or downside litigation risk and the net impact on investors’ behavior could therefore be indeterminable. 
However, since previous empirical evidence mostly links the litigious tone to an increase in trading 
volume and stock return volatility (Loughran and McDonald, 2011), we formulate our third research 
hypothesis to reflect the downside, letting our empirical evidence challenge the following null 
hypothesis: 
H3: The litigious tone in operational risk event announcements is negatively associated with loss-
adjusted abnormal stock returns and positively associated with abnormal CDS spreads following the 
announcements. 
 
2.2.4. Interactions with Loss Amount Disclosure 
The operational loss amount (whether exact or estimated) is an objective measure of the operational 
risk event’s financial severity. Since the net negative tone (i.e. bad news) in the operational risk 
announcement could be seen as a qualitative assessment reflecting the subjective beliefs of media 
channels about the severity of the operational risk event, it would be expected that the net negative tone 
and operational loss amount disclosed in the media channels are interpreted by investors as substitute 
sources of information. In contrast, disclosing the operational loss amount, as a quantifiable, reliable 
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measure of severity, is expected to neutralize the adverse impact of the narrative bad news (i.e. the net 
negative tone) on the loss firm’s reputation. Albeit the work of Fischoff (1995, p. 139) has highlighted 
that although managers may ‘hand over the numbers’, the suspicious recipients of such raw information 
(investors) may re-adjust these estimates to accommodate their perception that they have been 
calculated under likely biases internally.  
We also argue that the disclosure of an exact amount or best estimate of the operational loss would 
partially reduce the uncertainty around the operational risk event’s severity but may not remove the 
uncertainty associated with the causes and consequences of the operational risk event (for example, the 
uncertainty concerning the underlying Internal Control Weaknesses (ICWs)9 or any possible future 
effects on the business model, corporate governance10, and customer satisfaction of the loss firm). 
Hence, to the extent that the underlying uncertainty has been reduced by the loss amount disclosure, we 
expect the calming effect of the uncertainty tone on the equity and debt markets to be counteracted. 
Similarly, we argue that when the operational loss amount is disclosed, the degree of underlying 
litigation risk (whether upside or downside) will shrink because investors will know, or at least can 
more accurately estimate, the maximum legal reserve which needs to accumulated by the loss firm in 
relation to the announced operational risk event. Hence, the information conveyed by narratives on 
litigation risk (i.e. the litigious tone) in the first news announcement could become less influential to 
investors. Therefore, we formulate our fourth hypothesis as follows: 
H4: The associations of the textual tones in operational risk event announcements with loss-adjusted 
abnormal stock returns and abnormal CDS spreads following the announcements become weaker when 
the exact amount or best estimate of the loss is disclosed. 
 
2.2.5. Interactions with Firm Recognition 
Gillet et al. (2010) have shown that equity markets react favorably when the loss firm recognizes the 
operational risk event and/or loss. Hence, such a corporate confession may calm turbulent market 
reactions and alleviate the adverse impact of the net negative tone whereas a lack of confession as 
investigated by Kothari et al. (2009) can increase the cost of equity for the offending organization. 
However, such a confession could also give more credibility and attention to the narrative bad news, 
thus magnifying its adverse market consequences. We also attribute the Gillet et al. (2010) finding to 
the higher degree of certainty implied by firm recognition which the markets seem to appreciate. Hence, 
                                                          
9 Chernobai et al. (2011) have found that ICWs are associated with higher frequency of operational risk events 
incurred by U.S. financial institutions, whilst Cosetllo and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) highlight that ICWs affect 
the contractual terms of borrowing from lenders based on the severity of the ICW. 
10 Barakat (2014) has shown that U.S. financial institutions respond to large operational risk announcements by 
making significant changes in their corporate governance structures and that equity markets react (either favorably 
or unfavorably) to such changes. 
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we expect the decreased underlying uncertainty caused by simultaneous firm recognition to mitigate 
the impact of the uncertainty tone in the first news announcement since investors become less uncertain 
and hence are less vulnerable to the sentimental effects of media news. However, firm recognition could 
have mixed effects on the underlying litigation risk. On the one hand, confession by the loss firm could 
indicate that it is in a weak legal position and hence likely to be exposed to a more severe court decision 
or regulatory sanction (i.e. downside litigation risk). In this case, investors might search for more 
litigation-related information in the first news announcement, thus amplifying the adverse impact of the 
litigious tone. On the other hand, it might imply that the loss firm is able to resolve the legal situation 
in a less hostile manner since it has already admitted the underlying fault (whether intentional or not). 
In this latter case, investors might become less concerned about searching for, or interpreting litigation-
related narratives, thus causing the litigious tone to be of less adverse impact. Therefore, we formulate 
our fifth hypothesis using the latter proposition and let our empirical evidence challenge it: 
H5: The associations of the textual tones in operational risk event announcements with loss-adjusted 
abnormal stock returns and abnormal CDS spreads following the announcements become weaker when 
the loss firm recognizes the event. 
 
2.2.6. Interactions with Regulatory Announcement 
Many operational risk announcements are associated with regulatory sanctions (which are related to 
underlying operational risk drivers) or regulatory announcements on emerging cases (i.e. on-going 
investigations or prosecutions). For example, the U.S. Department of Justice might announce that it is 
going to prosecute a certain bank for alleged wrong-doing or breach of fiduciary duties. Accompanying 
operational risk announcements in the media might include brief allusions or, in rare cases, actual 
contents of simultaneous regulatory announcements and additional information clarifying the relevant 
underlying facts and expected consequences of such a regulatory process. Hence, regulatory 
announcements can be seen by investors as alternative sources of information, thus reducing investors’ 
reliance on narrative bad media news to make their investment decisions. Obviously, regulatory 
announcements inject more credible information into the markets and are likely to reduce the degree of 
underlying uncertainty associated with the operational risk event. For example, Fiordelisi et al. (2014) 
found that reputational damage is only caused by ‘pure’ operational losses which are neither regulatory 
sanctions nor legal cases. We argue here that more ‘simultaneous’ ‘trustable’ sources of information 
and a lower degree of underlying uncertainty are likely to dissolve the favorable reputational impact of 
the uncertainty tone on investors’ behavior. In addition, litigation risk emerges mostly from either a 
legal (e.g. class action lawsuits) or regulatory (e.g. fines by regulators or supervisors) source; hence the 
importance of interacting the litigious tone with the regulatory announcement to extract any marginal 
effects due to differences in investors’ attitudes toward legal-related and regulatory-induced litigation 
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risks. If investors view regulatory-induced litigation risks to be more (less) severe than legal-related 
litigation risks, we then expect investors to be more (less) interested in searching for and processing 
litigious information when the operational risk event is (not) simultaneously announced by a regulatory 
body. Therefore, we formulate our sixth hypothesis as follows: 
H6: The associations of the textual tones in operational risk event announcements with loss-adjusted 
abnormal stock returns and abnormal CDS spreads following the announcements become weaker when 
the event is simultaneously announced by a regulatory body. 
2.2.7. Interactions with Settlement 
Gillet et al. (2010) have documented clear positive equity market reactions to settlement 
announcements on operational risk events, and Plunus et al. (2012) have documented similar reactions 
in debt markets. The settlement means that an in-court or out-of-court agreement has been reached or a 
final regulatory fine or sanction has been decided which the firm agrees with. It is noteworthy here to 
mention that settlement and firm recognition are not identical as the loss firm could recognize the event 
but would not accept a pending settlement or would decide to go through an appeal process. In very 
rare cases (only two events in our sample), the loss firm might accept the final settlement but does not 
admit any wrong-doing or fault within its internal control system or risk management function. Some 
might view settlement as an implicit recognition by the firm and therefore consider settlement as a sub-
division or special case of firm recognition. Although on first appearance it may seem that the final 
settlement obviously removes all of the uncertainty underlying the operational risk event, it is still 
possible that there is an element of unresolved ambiguity regarding the vulnerability of the loss firm to 
similar events or litigation processes in the future (possibly due to inherent ICWs, corporate governance 
problems, or risk management deficiencies). This is of particular importance within the UK as the FCA 
incentivize early settlement for operational risk breaches by reducing financial penalties by up to 30%. 
Hence, we expect settlements (if explicitly mentioned in the first news announcement) to remove, if not 
reverse, the favorable impact of the uncertainty tone on investors’ behavior. Similarly, final settlements 
should indicate no further ‘current’ litigation risk but it could still pinpoint to future litigation risk 
associated with similar events or other events caused by the same underlying factors of the current 
event. Hence, we again posit that the sentimental effects of the litigious tone would become weaker 
when a final settlement is mentioned in the first news announcement on the operational risk event. 
Therefore, we formulate our seventh research hypothesis as follows: 
H7: The associations of the textual tones in operational risk event announcements with loss-adjusted 
abnormal stock returns and abnormal CDS spreads following the announcements become weaker when 
the event is settled. 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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3.1. Sample Selection and Composition  
Table 1 details our sample selection procedures. We begin with all 16110 public announcements in 
the commercial database ORIC11 which spans the period 1921 – 2015 (data extracted in March 2015). 
Since ORIC announcements are only regularly collected from 2010, our sample period covers the post 
global financial crisis (post-GFC) years (2010 – 2014). We exclude the following from the dataset: 
announcements before 2010 and after 2014, announcements in non-financial firms because the nature 
of operational risk is clearly different from that in financial institutions, announcements in loss firms 
not headquartered in USA, Europe, Canada, and Australia to coincide with previous operational risk 
studies which focused mainly on U.S. & European firms, announcements which have no clear 
operational risk classification (event type or business line), announcements whose dates are not 
confirmed or full-text news articles not found (we have cross-checked and downloaded available full-
texts of operational risk announcements from LexisNexis news database), announcements in privately 
held financial firms, and  announcements with outliers in reputational returns (i.e. less than -10% or 
more than 10%) or abnormal CDS relative spread changes (i.e. less than -50% or more than 50%).12 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Hence, we end up with a final sample of 305 operational risk announcements from 90 financial 
institutions in 18 countries (Table 2, Panel A) which hit the public media news during the years 2010 - 
2014. We believe that our final sample is of a good size as it exceeds, in terms of yearly average, the 
sample sizes in most of previous studies on operational and reputational risks such as 115 events (1974 
– 2004) in Perry and de Fontnouvelle (2005), 492 events (1978 – 2003) in Cummins et al. (2006); 152 
events (1994 – 2006) in Gillet et al. (2010), 71 events (1994 – 2006) in Plunus et al. (2012), 136 events 
(2000 – 2009) in Sturm (2013a); 99 events (2004 – 2010) in Sturm (2013b); and 430 events (1994 – 
2008) in Fiordelisi et al. (2014). 
Table 2 (Panel B) presents the composition of our final sample by industry type. Our final sample is 
diversified as it encompasses 16 different industry types of financial institutions (according to 
Bloomberg classification), with most of the sample coming from banking-related activities (218/71%) 
and the remaining events coming mainly from brokerage-related activities (26/9%), wealth 
management-related activities (21/7%), and insurance-related activities (21/7%). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 More detailed information about the ORIC database is provided in Appendix A. 
12 Our results remain qualitatively similar if outliers are not removed from the sample. 
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3.2. Variables Tested and Data Sources 
Our empirical analysis is performed in the event window (-10,+10) around operational risk event 
announcements in our final sample. Our event window is clean of any other news disclosed or published 
about our sample firms. We have not extended our research beyond a two-week trading period before 
and after our announcement dates to make sure that our results are not contaminated by other material 
firm-specific information contemporaneously released to the markets such as earnings announcements, 
credit rating updates and corporate governance changes. To provide a clearer picture of market reactions 
to media tones, we split our overall event window (-10,+10) into four smaller event windows which 
are: i) pre-announcement window (-10,-1), ii) announcement day (0,0), iii) post-announcement – first 
week (+1,+5) and iv) post-announcement – second week (+6,+10). Examining pre-announcement 
windows would reveal whether the leakage of private information has caused any anomalous effects 
(e.g. bias in the media tones) and post-announcement windows would capture the market reactions to 
the public information disclosed in the media news. 
 
3.2.1. Equity-based Reputational Impact 
Following the literature on operational risk announcements (De Fontnouvelle and Perry, 2005; Gillet 
et al., 2010; Sturm, 2013a; Fiordelisi et al., 2013; Fiordelisi et al., 2014), we measure the informational 
impact of textual information in operational risk announcements using the Cumulative Abnormal Stock 
Returns (CAR) which is computed utilizing the single-index market model with the estimation period 
being a window of 250 trading days ending one calendar month before the announcement date. We 
collect data on stock prices and local stock market indices from DataStream. 
Also, following the literature on reputational risk (Gillet et al., 2010; Fiordelisi et al., 2013; Fiordelisi 
et al., 2014), we measure the equity-based reputational impact using the loss-adjusted 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 which we 
call the reputational return or 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 and compute according to the following formula for an event 𝑖𝑖: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)𝑖𝑖 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)𝑖𝑖 + |𝑂𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 | 
We measure the market capitalization eleven trading days before the announcement date to exclude 
any impact on the firm’s market value caused by leakage of information in the two trading weeks 
preceding the announcement date. We follow a conservative approach and assume the operational loss 
amount to be zero if no exact figure or best estimate has been disclosed in the relevant event window13. 
In this way, we relax the strong assumption posited by Gillet et al. (2010) that the market is able to 
accurately estimate the settlement amount on the first announcement date even if it is not actually 
                                                          
13 We cross-checked the data downloaded from ORIC with the announcements extracted from LexisNexis to 
confirm whether the loss amount had been disclosed. 
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disclosed. Since our whole event window (-10,+10) is clean of any other announcements, we believe 
that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 can accurately measure the ‘pure’ reputational impact (i.e. non-mechanical market reaction 
to the information disclosed in the operational risk announcement). 
 
3.2.2. Debt-based Reputational Impact  
Following (Sturm, 2013b), we use Cumulative Abnormal CDS Spread Changes (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) as a measure 
of debt-based reputational damage. To the extent that losses are covered by shareholders’ equity, 
operational risk events should be of no relevance to creditors. Therefore, any positive impact on 
abnormal CDS spread changes would indicate both an increase in the implied default risk of the loss 
firm and a pure reputational loss. 
We have chosen to employ CDS spreads rather than bond returns to measure the debt-based impact 
of operational risk announcements (i.e. which we consider as a proxy for both the pure reputational 
impact and change in implied default risk around the operational risk announcement). There are three 
reasons for our choice. Firstly, Ericsson, Jacobs, & Oviedo (2009) found that CDS spreads are superior 
to stock returns and bond returns in measuring the default risk of the business entity. Second, Mengle 
(2007) documented a boost in CDS market liquidity due to the increased contribution of hedge funds in 
more recent years. Third, Blanco et al. (2005) showed that the causality relationship flows from CDS 
spreads (the cause) to bond spreads (the effect) and not vice versa. 
We collect data on five year modified modified structure CDS spreads in Euro from DataStream and 
data on the iTraxx index from Bloomberg. 
We compute cumulative abnormal CDS spread change (CASC) for firm i on day t as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) − (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖−1) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝑝𝑝1, 𝑝𝑝2) = �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝒕𝒕𝟐𝟐
𝒕𝒕=𝒕𝒕𝟏𝟏
 
3.2.3. Financial Sentiment Tones 
These are the main explanatory variables of interest in our empirical analysis. Here, we use financial 
sentiment tones proposed by Loughran and McDonald (2011) from their comprehensive research into 
10-K filings of U.S. firms. We focus on four types of financial sentiment words which are positive 
words, negative words, uncertainty words, and litigious words. We then construct the following three 
proxies of textual tone in operational risk announcements: 
𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = �𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 − 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿
𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 � ∗ 100 
𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = � 𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿
𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿� ∗ 100 
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𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = � 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿
𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿� ∗ 100 
Where: 
𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿= 𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 + 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 + 𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿+ 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿  
We compute these three financial sentiment tones for the longest news article disclosing the 
operational risk event and published on day (0).14 
 3.2.4. Operational Risk Event Features and Announcement Characteristics 
Since the reputational impact of operational risk announcements could also be caused by the features 
of the operational risk event per se or characteristics of the announcement, we control for such factors 
in our multivariate regressions. Firstly, we employ a dummy variable to capture whether the operational 
loss amount is disclosed in the first announcement. In addition, we control for whether the operational 
risk event has been recognized by the loss firm itself. This does not necessarily mean that the loss firm 
has issued a press release but this recognition could simply be mentioned in the first announcement (for 
example, a representative of the loss firm has made a short comment affirming the event but challenging 
the relevant fine imposed by a regulatory body or court of law).  Moreover, we include a dummy to 
indicate whether a simultaneous regulatory announcement concerning the operational risk event has 
been released. Almost always, operational risk announcements come out on the same day as the relevant 
regulatory announcement. 
Furthermore, a dummy is included to indicate whether the first announcement includes a final 
settlement. Since our sample is recent, many of our operational risk announcements have not yet been 
settled with only 22% settlement announcements included in our final sample. It is to be noted that no 
settlement does not mechanically imply no firm recognition as we relax our definition of settlement to 
include cases when the settlement is accepted by only one party to the legal or regulatory conflict. 
Following this logic, we find that approximately 20% of our no-settlement announcements have already 
been recognized by the loss firm. Furthermore, we control for the location of the operational risk event 
itself (not the announcement) and whether it has taken place outside the incorporation’s country. 
Additionally, we consider whether the operational risk event has included top corporate figures (i.e. 
C-suite officers or board directors of the loss firm). Moreover, we control for the fraudulent nature of 
the event by including a dummy to capture whether the operational risk event is classified as internal 
                                                          
14 We choose the longest news article because we expect that equity and debt investors are looking for the most 
comprehensive and most detailed source of information on the operational risk event. We get qualitatively similar 
results when we use the averages of financial sentiment tones for all news articles published on day (0).  
17 
 
 
fraud or external fraud event type. We collect data on these dummies by cross-checking the relevant 
news articles in LexisNexis. Finally, since ORIC employs some additional non-Basel II business lines 
such as life insurance, general insurance and insurance broking, we include a dummy variable to control 
for the Basel II business lines which are: corporate finance, trading and sales, retail banking, commercial 
banking, payment and settlement, agency services, asset management and retail brokerage. 
Finally, we gauge the extent of media coverage using two variables. First, we control for the 
international media attention using a dummy capturing whether the operational risk event has been 
featured in The Financial Times (FT) or The Wall Street Journal (WSJ). Second, we count the number 
of online news articles covering the operational risk event on day (0). We collect data on these two 
variables from LexisNexis. 
3.2.5. Control Variables 
To properly identify our multivariate regression models, we include some common control variables. 
Firstly, we control for the size, profitability, leverage, and growth of the loss firm using the natural 
logarithm of total assets, ROA, long-term debt to shareholders’ equity ratio, and market-to-book ratio, 
respectively. In addition to accounting-based proxies, we also control for the riskiness of the loss firm 
using market-based measures which are the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns and 
monthly betas. Moreover, we consider the share’s floatation by including the percentage of outstanding 
shares available to ordinary shareholders one week before the announcement date. In addition, we 
control for trading volume by including the natural logarithm of the number of shares traded for the 
stock (in thousands) one week before the announcement date. We collect accounting and market data 
from DataStream. Since we conduct a multi-country analysis, we control for the GDP per capita whose 
data is collected from the World Bank’s website. 
Further, to account for any leakage of private information before the first operational risk event 
announcement date, we include lagged measures of the informational and reputational impact over the 
trading week preceding the first announcement date. For example, in the multivariate regressions 
modelling the equity-based reputational impact, we use 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(−10,−1) as a proxy for any leakage of 
information before the first announcement date. By definition, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(−10,−1) is not added as a control 
variable in the pre-announcement regressions since it has already been included in the computation of 
the dependent variable  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(−10,−1). 
Finally, to consider the information environment of the loss firm before the announcement date, we 
employ the number of analysts estimating the firm’s EPS in the month preceding the announcement. 
We collect data on analyst coverage from Bloomberg. Additionally, we control for the creditworthiness 
of the loss firm by including S&P long-term local issuer credit rating in the form of a cardinal scale 
which ranges from AAA=1 to D or SD = 22. We collect credit rating data from Bloomberg. 
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3.2.6. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive information on all our variables. The average reputational return 
(RCAR) decreases from 0.44% and 0.31% in the event windows (-10,-1) and (0,0), respectively, to            
-0.29% and -0.10% in the post-announcement windows (+1,+5) and (+6,+10), respectively. Together 
with the wide range and material heterogeneity in CASC in all pre-announcement and post-
announcement windows, these statistics do not clearly indicate whether operational risk announcements 
would always cause an equity-based or debt-based reputational damage, thus calling for a more in-depth 
univariate and multivariate analyses of the determinants of the reputational effects of these 
announcements. 
Since operational risk announcements typically reveal bad news on the loss firm, the net negative 
tone is expectedly dominating the financial sentiment of the announcements with 54% on average, 
compared with averages of only 8% for the uncertainty tone and 26% for the litigious tone. It is also as 
expected that the litigious tone dominate the uncertainty tone as most operational risk announcements 
include detailed legal or regulatory information. These financial sentiment statistics give credibility to 
the Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary as appropriately classifying the textual tones in our 
sample of operational risk announcements. 
Additionally, there is a clear heterogeneity in the announcement characteristics and event features, 
which enable us to test their main and marginal reputational effects. For example, 68% of the 
announcements disclose the exact loss amount or its best estimate, while 36% and 58% of operational 
risk announcements are recognized by the loss firm itself and simultaneously announced by a regulatory 
body, respectively. Moreover, only 22% of the first announcements include final settlements which 
reduces the possibility of private information leaking prior to the first announcement. Furthermore, only 
8% of events involve top executives or board directors, and 26% of events took place in a different 
country. Finally, most of the announcements relate to events of non-fraudulent nature (88%) and 
occurred in one of the eight Basel II business lines (79%). 
Our sample events receive substantial international attention since 48% of them have been featured 
in FT or WSJ. In addition, our sample reflects a considerable media exposure as there are, on average, 
15 news articles covering each operational risk event.15 
Finally, the wide range of accounting-based proxies, market-based measures, and information 
environment factors all confirm the diversity of our sample as it includes big corporations (maximum 
total assets of $2,867,353 million USD) and small firms (minimum total assets of $644 million USD), 
profitable (maximum ROA of 7.20%) and non-profitable firms (minimum ROA of -3.28%), high-risk 
                                                          
15 Our results remain qualitatively similar if operational risk events covered by only one news article on day (0) 
are removed from our sample.   
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(maximum beta of 4.46) and low-risk firms (minimum beta of 0.44), and highly visible (37 analysts) 
and least visible firms (only one analyst)16. On the macroeconomic level, our sample covers both 
developing economies (minimum GDP per capita of $10,646 USD) and highly advanced economies 
(maximum GDP per capita of $100,575 USD). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
3.2.7. Correlation Analysis 
In the interests of brevity, Pearson correlation coefficients are not reported17. However, It is 
noteworthy that the medium negative correlations between the three financial sentiment tones (-0.45 
between Uncertainty Tone and Litigious Tone, -0.30 between Uncertainty Tone and Net Negative Tone, 
and -0.25 between Litigious Tone and Net Negative Tone) reflect an overlap between the three textual 
tones (i.e. words classified under two or more of these tones) and show that these textual tones could 
partially substitute each other (Loughran & McDonald, 2015). This has two implications for the design 
of our empirical study. Firstly, we run a separate baseline regression and four interaction regressions 
for each of the textual tones. Secondly, the interaction terms could reflect the marginal effects of 
overlapping words (e.g. the interaction term Settlement Dum * Uncertainty Tone could reflect the 
marginal effects of uncertain bad news once a final settlement is announced and the underlying certainty 
is fully resolved). Finally, untabulated correlation coefficients do not reveal any serious 
multicollinearity concerns. In addition, it is noteworthy that Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores do 
not reflect any material biases in variable coefficients for our multivariate regression models. 
3.3. Multivariate Regression Models 
In this subsection, we identify our equity-based and debt-based multivariate regression models (both 
baseline and interactions) that will be utilized to test our research hypotheses.     
3.3.1. Equity-based Reputational Impact Regressions 
First, we test the following OLS model to extract the equity-based reputational impact of financial 
sentiment tones in the first media news announcement of operational risk event 𝑖𝑖 incurred by the loss 
firm 𝑗𝑗 incorporated in country 𝑀𝑀 during the event window (𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧): 
                                                          
16 Our results remain qualitatively similar if firms followed by only one equity analyst are removed from our 
sample. 
17 Full results on Pearson correlation coefficients among all our variables are available upon request.  
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧) = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝛽𝛽1𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽6𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽8𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 & 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐽𝐽 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽11𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽14𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽15𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝%𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝(𝑉𝑉𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝)𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽17𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽18𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽19𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽20𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽21𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽22𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(−10,−1) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
3.3.2. Debt-based Reputational Impact Regressions 
To test the debt-based reputational impact caused by financial sentiment tones in the first media 
news announcement of operational risk event 𝑖𝑖 incurred by the loss firm 𝑗𝑗 incorporated in country 𝑀𝑀 
during the event window (𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧), we test the following OLS models: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧) = 𝜅𝜅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝛿𝛿1𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝛿𝛿1𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+ 𝛿𝛿2𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+ 𝛿𝛿4𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+ 𝛿𝛿6𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿7𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+ 𝛿𝛿8𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿9𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿10𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 & 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐽𝐽 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖+ 𝛿𝛿11𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷 𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿12𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+ 𝛿𝛿13𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿14𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿15𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿16𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖+ 𝛿𝛿17𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿18𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿19𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖+ 𝛿𝛿20𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿21𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(−10,−1) + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
3.3.3. Interaction Regressions 
To examine whether the reputational effects could be partially driven by the operational risk 
announcement characteristics, we interact each of the four variables measuring the nature of disclosure 
in operational risk announcements (i.e. loss amount disclosure, firm recognition, regulatory 
announcement, final settlement) with the three textual tones (net negative tone, uncertainty tone, 
litigious tone). To alleviate collinearity concerns, we separately interact each disclosure characteristic 
with each of our textual tones. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are used to infer the 
significance of the coefficients estimated in all our baseline and interaction regressions. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
In this subsection, we present and analyze the results of the event studies conducted on our measures 
of equity-based and debt-based reputational damage. The results in this section provide an indication of 
the reputational effects of our sample events in general, and the inspected media tones more specifically.  
4.1.1. Event Study on the Equity-based Reputational Effects of Operational Risk Event 
Announcements 
Table 4 reports the average reputational returns (RCARs) for different event windows and various 
subsamples of media tones. Top25% and Bottom75% subsamples include the events in the upper 
quartile and lowest three quartiles of the relevant media tone’s distribution, respectively. Following 
Fiordelisi et al. (2013 & 2014) who performed equity-based event studies on operational risk event 
announcements in an international context, we assess the statistical significance of RCARs in our main 
and subsamples by running the parametric test presented by Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) 
which adjusts for any event-induced increase in return volatility18,19. 
In Table 4, the equity-based reputational damage materializes most in the post-announcement period, 
with a mean RCAR amounting to -0.29% and -0.10% in the event windows (+1,+5) and (+6,+10), 
respectively. However, mean comparisons of various media tone subsamples reveal some clear trends. 
First, the event window (-10,-1) does not show any significant differences in the mean RCARs for the 
different media tone subsamples, thus initially indicating that media tones are not driven by any pre-
announcement leakage of private information. Second, the biggest and most significant differences in 
subsample means occur in the event window (+1,+5) with qualitatively similar but less significant 
results in the event windows (0,0) and (+6,+10). Third, in the event window (+1,+5), the Top-25% 
subsamples of the net negative, uncertainty and litigious tones have mean RCARs that are significantly 
lower by 0.77%, higher by 1.75% and lower by 0.85% than their respective Bottom-75% subsamples. 
Taken together, the results in Table 4 support our hypotheses H1, H2 and H3. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
                                                          
18 In unreported robustness checks, we follow Fiordelisi et al. (2013 & 2014) and assess the statistical significance 
of RCARs using two other parametric tests which are: i) the normally distributed test presented by Campbell, Lo, 
and Mackinley (1997) and ii) the variance-adjusted test applied by Borenstein and Zimmerman (1988) and 
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). We also apply the non-parametric Sign Test (Peterson, 1989; Campbell, 
Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997) which relaxes the normal distribution assumption of abnormal returns. Overall, our 
univariate results and inferences on RCARs remain qualitatively unchanged for all parametric and non-parametric 
tests performed. Full results of robustness checks are available upon request. 
19 For detailed information on the estimation procedures and hypothesis tests of parametric and non-parametric 
statistics applied in event studies on international samples of operational risk event announcements, review 
Fiordelisi et al. (2014). 
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4.1.2. Event Study on the Debt-based Reputational Effects of Operational Risk Event 
Announcements 
Table 5 reports the average cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes (CASCs) for different event 
windows and various subsamples of media tones around operational risk event announcements. 
Top25% and Bottom75% subsamples are constructed as mentioned in the previous section 4.1.1. 
Following Sturm (2013b) who performed a debt-based event study on operational risk event 
announcements in a European context, we test the statistical significance of CASCs using the cross-
sectional t-test20. 
The debt-based results in Table 5 are mostly consistent with the equity-based inferences drawn from 
Table 4. There is a debt-based reputational damage suffered in all post-announcement windows with 
the most severe one being a significant increase of 2.4 basis points (bps) in the event window (+1,+5). 
Additionally, the event window (-1,-10) does not show any significant differences in the mean CASCs 
of various media tone subsamples. This confirms the initial indication given above that media tones are 
not affected by any pre-announcement leakage of private information. Moreover, in the event window 
(+1,+5), the Top-25% subsamples of the net negative, uncertainty and litigious tones have mean CASCs 
that are significantly higher by 1.21bps, lower by 2.21bps and higher by 1.63bps than their respective 
Bottom-75% subsamples. Overall, the results in Table 5 also support our hypotheses H1, H2 and H3. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
Since univariate results need to be interpreted with caution due to unobserved heterogeneity, we 
expand on the initial inferences drawn in the previous subsection by running a comprehensive set of 
baseline and interaction regressions. Hence, in this subsection, our multivariate results are discussed 
and utilized to test our research hypotheses. 
4.2.1. Baseline Regressions 
In Table 6, we inspect the equity-based (Panel A) and debt-based (Panel B) reputational effects of 
media tones in operational risk event announcements. As discussed in the following paragraphs, the 
results consistently show an adverse reputational impact of the net negative and litigious tones and a 
favorable reputational impact of the uncertainty tone.  
In Table 6 (Panel A), the coefficients of the three media tones enter insignificant in the pre-
announcement window (-10,-1). This indicates that media tones on Day 0 are not driven by any pre-
announcement leakage of private information. This result is consistent in all our baseline regressions. 
                                                          
20 In unreported robustness checks, we follow Sturm (2013b) and perform the non-parametric Wilcoxon sign-
ranked test and get qualitatively similar univariate results and inferences on CASCs. Full results of robustness 
checks are available upon request. 
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However, it is interesting to note that Number of News Articles enters significantly negative in the 
reputational return regression, thus indicating that more severe pre-announcement reputational damage 
would increase the extent of media coverage on Day 0. Surprisingly, FT & WSJ Dum enters significantly 
positive in the post-announcement windows, thus indicating that international media attention is 
associated with less severe equity-based reputational damage. One possible interpretation is that 
international media such as The Financial Times or The Wall Street Journal are more likely to feature 
operational risk event announcements in reputable firms that are more resilient and likely to safely 
weather the storm. It is though noteworthy that there is a very short adverse debt-based reputational 
impact of international media coverage on Day 0 (Table 6, Panel B) where FT & WSJ Dum increases 
CASC by around 1.1bps. However, this impact does not persist beyond the first announcement day. 
Returning to our first three research hypotheses, we find that the strongest impact of media tones 
occurs in the event window (+1,+5) followed by (+6,+10) and (0,0). This is expected due to the five-
day length of the two post-announcement windows compared with the short one-day reaction captured 
in the event window (0,0). Since our results are consistent across all post-announcement windows, we 
focus all our coming discussions in this subsection on the event window (+1,+5) where the strongest 
and most significant  coefficients of media tones are reported. 
In Table 6 (Panel A), a one standard deviation increase in the net negative tone (i.e. 14%) and 
litigious tone (i.e. 12%) would decrease RCAR(+1,+5) by 0.54% and 0.51%, respectively, whereas a 
one standard deviation increase in the uncertainty tone (i.e. 7.5%) would increase RCAR(+1,+5) by 
0.47%. Similar economically powerful and statistically significant results occur in the debt-based 
baseline regressions (Table 6, Panel B). A one standard deviation increase in the net negative tone and 
litigious tone would increase CASC(+1,+5) by 0.69bps and 0.74bps, respectively. On the contrary, a 
one standard deviation increase in the uncertainty tone would decrease CASC(+1,+5) by 0.69bps. 
Overall, the results in Table 6 coincide with the event study results reported in Tables 4 & 5 and, 
hence, strongly support our research hypotheses H1, H2, and H3. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
4.2.2. Interactions with Loss Amount Disclosure 
In Table 7, we examine whether the equity-based and debt-based reputational effects of media tones 
are moderated by the disclosure of the exact amount or best estimate of the operational risk loss. As 
discussed in the following paragraphs, the results show that only the uncertainty tone is moderated by 
operational loss amount disclosure. 
In Table 7 (Model i), the interaction term Loss Amount Disclosure Dum * Uncertainty Tone enters 
significantly negative in the event window (+1,+5). For example, a one standard deviation increase in 
the uncertainty tone would be associated with a 0.59% less favorable impact on RCAR(+1,+5) if the 
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operational loss amount is disclosed. The debt-based results in Table 7 (Model ii) confirm the equity-
based results. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the uncertainty tone would be associated 
with a marginal increase of 3.04bps in CASC(+1,+5) if the operational loss amount is disclosed.  
However, the interaction terms Loss Amount Disclosure Dum * Net Negative Tone and Loss Amount 
Disclosure Dum * Litigious Tone enter with the expected signs but insignificant in the post-
announcement windows. Overall, the results in Table 7 show that the loss amount disclosure dissolves 
the calming effect of the uncertainty tone in operational risk event announcements. Hence, our research 
hypothesis H4 is supported only for the uncertainty tone. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
4.2.3. Interactions with Firm Recognition 
In Table 8, we examine whether the equity-based and debt-based reputational effects of media tones 
are moderated by the loss firm admitting the occurrence or extent of the operational risk event. As 
discussed in the following paragraphs, the results show that only the uncertainty tone is moderated by 
firm recognition. 
In Table 8 (Model i), the interaction term Firm Recognition Dum * Uncertainty Tone enters 
significantly negative in all post-announcement windows with the strongest moderation impact incurred 
in the event window (+1,+5). For example, a one standard deviation increase in the uncertainty tone 
would be associated with a 0.49% less favorable impact on RCAR(+1,+5) if the event is recognized by 
the loss firm. The debt-based results in Table 8 (Model ii) confirm the equity-based results. For example, 
a one standard deviation increase in the uncertainty tone would be associated with a marginal increase 
of 1.61bps in CASC(+1,+5) if the loss firm recognizes the event.  
However, the interaction terms Firm Recognition Dum * Net Negative Tone and Firm Recognition 
Dum * Litigious Tone enter with the expected signs but insignificant in the post-announcement 
windows. Overall, the results in Table 8 indicate that firm recognition reduces the ambiguity 
surrounding the operational risk event and hence reinforces the adverse financial sentiment of equity 
and debt investors who become more certain about the scope of the bad news that have unexpectedly 
hit the markets. Hence, our research hypothesis H5 is supported only for the uncertainty tone. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
4.2.4. Interactions with Regulatory Announcement 
In Table 9, we examine whether the equity-based and debt-based reputational effects of media tones 
are moderated by simultaneous announcements made by regulatory bodies such as banking supervisors 
or stock exchange watchdogs. As discussed in the following paragraphs, the results show that the 
financial sentiment effects of the uncertainty and litigious tones in the media news are reversed and 
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become much weaker once a regulatory announcement regarding the operational risk event has been 
made. 
In Table 9 (Model i), the interaction term Regulatory Announcement Dum * Uncertainty Tone enters 
significantly negative in post-announcement windows with the strongest moderation impact incurred in 
the event window (+1,+5). For example, a one standard deviation increase in the uncertainty tone would 
be associated with a 0.94% less favorable impact on RCAR(+1,+5) if a regulatory body makes a relevant 
announcement. When it comes to the uncertainty tone, it is interesting to note that the dissolving effect 
of regulatory announcements is much stronger than that of firm recognition, thus pinpointing the higher 
credibility of third-party regulated information disclosed around operational risk event announcements. 
Additionally, in Table 9 (Model i), the interaction term Regulatory Announcement Dum * Litigious 
Tone enters significantly positive in all post-announcement windows with the strongest moderation 
impact incurred in the event window (+1,+5). For example, a one standard deviation increase in the 
litigious tone would be associated with a 1.16 % more favorable impact on RCAR(+1,+5) if a regulatory 
body makes a relevant announcement. 
The debt-based results in Table 9 (Model ii) confirm the equity-based results. For example, a one 
standard deviation increase in the uncertainty tone would be associated with a marginal increase of 
1.62bps in CASC(+1,+5) if a simultaneous regulatory announcement is made. On the contrary, a one 
standard deviation increase in the litigious tone would be associated with a marginal decrease of 1.78bps 
in CASC(+1,+5) if there is a relevant announcement by a regulatory body. 
However, the interaction term Regulatory Announcement Dum * Net Negative Tone enters with the 
expected sign but insignificant in the post-announcement windows. Overall, the results in Table 9 show 
that regulatory announcements reduce the level of uncertainty and substitute the litigation risk related 
information reflected in the media news on operational risk events. Hence, our research hypothesis H6 
is supported only for the uncertainty and litigious tones. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
4.2.5. Interactions with Settlement 
In Table 10, we examine whether the equity-based and debt-based reputational effects of media 
tones are moderated by final settlements which usually involve a court decision or regulatory fine to 
which the loss firm consents and hence no further action by any relevant party is expected. As discussed 
in the following paragraphs, the results show that final settlements would dissolve the ambiguity and 
litigation risk associated with operational risk events and hence tend to cancel out the reputational 
effects of the uncertainty and litigious tones.  
In Table 10 (Model i), the interaction term Settlement Dum * Uncertainty Tone enters significantly 
negative in post-announcement windows with the strongest moderation impact incurred in the event 
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window (+1,+5). For example, a one standard deviation increase in the uncertainty tone would be 
associated with a 1.14% less favorable impact on RCAR(+1,+5) if a final settlement is announced. 
Additionally, the interaction term Settlement Dum * Litigious Tone enters significantly positive in the 
post-announcement windows with the strongest moderation impact incurred in the event window 
(+1,+5). For example, a one standard deviation increase in the litigious tone would be associated with 
a 2.84% more favorable impact on RCAR(+1,+5) if a final settlement is announced. 
The debt-based results in Table 10 (Model ii) confirm the equity-based results. For example, a one 
standard deviation increase in the uncertainty tone would be associated with a marginal increase of 
2.86bps in CASC(+1,+5) if a settlement announcement is made. On the contrary, a one standard 
deviation increase in the litigious tone would be associated with a marginal decrease of 1.98bps in 
CASC(+1,+5) if a settlement is announced. 
However, the interaction term Settlement Dum * Net Negative Tone enters with the expected sign 
but insignificant in the post-announcement windows. Overall, the results in Table 10 show that the 
financial sentiment effects of the uncertainty and litigious tones become much weaker and are even 
reversed if the operational risk event announcement involves a final settlement. These moderation 
effects are stronger than those of regulatory announcements not involving a final settlement (e.g. when 
the regulatory body announces a fine which the loss firm will appeal). Hence, our research hypothesis 
H7 is supported only for the uncertainty and litigious tones. 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
4.3. Robustness Checks 
In this subsection, we run a number of robustness checks to examine the generalizability of our main 
multivariate results in different cultural and economic contexts and their persistence under various 
model identification strategies. 
4.3.1. Subsamples by Linguistic Communication 
Since we collect full-texts of operational risk event announcements only in English, we want to 
examine whether our main baseline and interaction results are driven by the cultural impact of linguistic 
communication when the loss firms are listed in stock exchanges dominated in non-English speaking 
countries. Although the majority of our sample firms are multi-national institutions which are listed on 
big stock exchanges in terms of market capitalization, we still find that it is crucial to split our final 
sample into an Anglo-Saxon subsample (233 events) and a non-Anglo-Saxon subsample (72 events) to 
isolate the cultural effects due to language differences (See Table 2, Panel A for a list of the countries 
in each subsample). We define an Anglo-Saxon country as an English-speaking country. Since our 
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strongest and most significant main results come in the event window (+1,+5), we report the results of 
our robustness checks only for RCAR(+1,+5) and CASC(+1,+5)21. 
The baseline and interaction results for the subsamples by linguistic communication are reported in 
Table 11. For baseline regressions, although all coefficients of media tones enter with the expected 
signs, they are much bigger (by a factor ranging from 3.5 to 6 times) and more significant in Anglo-
Saxon countries. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the uncertainty tone would increase 
RCAR(+1,+5) by 1.09% in an Anglo-Saxon country but only by 0.30% in a non-Anglo-Saxon country. 
Moreover, a one standard deviation increase in the uncertainty tone would decrease CASC(+1,+5) by 
1.61bps in an Anglo-Saxon country but only by 0.36bps in a non-Anglo-Saxon country. However, the 
net negative tone and litigious tone enter insignificant in non-Anglo-Saxon countries. This result 
indicates that our English-dominated media tones are better able to predict the equity-based and debt-
based reputational effects of operational risk event announcements in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
For the interaction coefficients reported in Table 11, the results are qualitatively similar to our main 
interaction results reported in Tables 7 – 10. Similar to the baseline regressions, the direct and 
interaction terms are much bigger and more significant in the Anglo-Saxon subsample. However, there 
are two main differences from our main interaction results. Both interaction terms Loss Amount 
Disclosure Dum * Net Negative Tone and Firm Recognition Dum * Net Negative Tone enter 
significantly positive in the reputational return regression and significantly negative in the CDS spread 
regression only for Anglo-Saxon countries. This result indicates that the operational risk severity 
captured by the loss amount substitutes the event’s adversity reflected in the narrative media news and 
that firm recognition alleviates the reputational effects of adverse media news about the operational risk 
event.  Though, both results do not extend to non-Anglo-Saxon countries possibly because our English-
dominated net negative tone does not capture the full event’s adversity reflected in the net negative tone 
dominated in the domestic language. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
4.3.2. Subsamples by Financial Structure 
Efficient market hypothesis (EMH) asserts that more efficient capital markets tend to react faster 
and incorporate newly released information into asset prices more accurately (Fama, 1970). However, 
EMH is more applicable in market-based economies where there is stronger competition and less 
information asymmetry in the capital markets than bank-based economies. Therefore, we want to 
examine whether our main baseline and interaction results are different across the two main types of 
financial structure. Hence, we follow Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) and measure the degree 
                                                          
21 Our robustness checks results are qualitatively similar to our main results for the other event windows (-10,-1), 
(0,0) and (+6,+10). 
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of the economy’s market orientation using the Structure-Activity indicator which equals stock market 
value traded to GDP divided by bank credit to GDP (higher values of Structure-Activity indicate a more 
market-based financial structure)22. More specifically, we consider an economy to be market-based if 
it has a Structure-Activity indicator of at least 123. Applying these criteria, the market-based and bank-
based subsamples comprise 230 events and 75 events, respectively (See Table 2, Panel A for a list of 
the countries in each subsample)24. 
The baseline and interaction results in the event window (+1,+5) for the subsamples by financial 
structure are reported in Table 12. For baseline regressions, although all coefficients of media tones 
enter with the expected signs, they are much bigger and more significant in market-based economies. 
However, the differences in the magnitude and significance across the financial structure subsamples 
are smaller than those across the linguistic communication subsamples. For example, a one standard 
deviation increase in the litigious tone would decrease RCAR(+1,+5) by 0.90% in a market-based 
economy but only by 0.39% in a bank-based economy. Moreover, a one standard deviation increase in 
the litigious tone would increase CASC(+1,+5) by 1.24bps in a market-based economy but only by 
0.51bps (insignificant at the 10% level) in a bank-based economy. However, the net negative tone is 
always insignificant at the 10% level in bank-based economies. This result coincides with market-based 
economies having more efficient capital markets that are more promptly responsive to the information 
contents and sentiments in operational risk event announcements. 
For the interaction coefficients reported in Table 12, the results are qualitatively similar to our main 
interaction results reported in Tables 7 – 10. Similar to the baseline regressions, the direct and 
interaction terms are much bigger and more significant in the market-based sample. However, there are 
two main differences from our main interaction results. Both interaction terms Loss Amount Disclosure 
Dum * Uncertainty Tone and Firm Recognition Dum * Uncertainty Tone are significant in the market-
based sample only. This result indicates that less efficient capital markets in bank-based economies do 
not fully incorporate the additional information revealed by the operational loss amount and firm 
recognition as a substitute that dissolves the favorable reputational effects of the uncertainty tone in 
narrative media news. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
4.3.3. Additional Robustness Checks 
                                                          
22 Our results remain qualitatively similar when we use other indicators of financial structure such as the Structure-
Size indictor which equals stock market capitalization to GDP divided by bank credit to GDP (Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine, 2009). 
23 Our results remain qualitatively unchanged when we use different thresholds to determine our subsamples by 
financial structure such as the median Structure-Activity indictor. 
24 Although there is a considerable overlap between our Anglo-Saxon and market-based subsamples that amounts 
to 86.5% (i.e. for events incurred in US and UK firms), we still believe that running separate robustness checks 
for the effects of linguistic communication and financial structure is crucial to examining the consistency of our 
main results in different cultural and economic environments. 
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We have performed several additional robustness checks to make sure that our main results hold 
under different assumptions25. First, we address the endogeneity concerns arising from the assumption 
that the actual media tones (i.e. the average net negative, litigious and uncertainty tones on Day 0) are 
a natural response to the operational risk event characteristics (i.e. the actual media tones are 
endogenous variables in our estimation models) by utilizing the lagged media tones (i.e. the average 
net negative, litigious and uncertainty tones in all media articles featuring the firm name in their 
headlines during the year ending one month before the announcement date).We believe that these lagged 
media tones are valid as instrumental variables in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression model 
given that they measure the ex ante overall attitude of the media towards the loss firm and hence 
correlate with the actual media tones on Day 0. In other words, these lagged media tones drive the 
reputational effects of operational risk event announcements exclusively through their impact on the 
actual media tones around these announcements. Running this 2SLS regression, the results for all our 
variables of interest remain qualitatively similar. 
Additionally, we rerun all our regressions for different post-announcement windows ranging from 
(0,+1) to (+9,+10) where the media tones are once measured on Day 0 (i.e. as used in our main 
regressions) and once measured on a one-day-lagged basis (e.g. for the analysis in the (+1,+5) event 
window, we use the average media tones in the event window (0,+4), and so forth). For different 
combinations of media tones and event windows, we find that Day-0 media tones and one-day-lagged 
average media tones are highly correlated and almost equally able to predict the reputational effects of 
operational risk event announcements during the two post-announcement trading weeks. 
Furthermore, we split our final sample into a North American (NA) subsample comprising USA and 
Canada (124 events) and a non-NA subsample comprising Europe and Australia (181 events) and rerun 
all our empirical analyses for each of the two subsamples, separately. We find that the reputational 
effects of media tones are stronger and more significant in the NA subsample (possibly because the NA 
subsample is 100% Anglo-Saxon, whereas the non-NA subsample is only 60% Anglo-Saxon). 
Moreover, we distinguish between news articles published in the online versions of printed 
newspapers, such as FT and WSJ, and those published in digital format only via websites and newsfeeds, 
such as Bloomberg and Reuters. We found no consistent differences in the reputational effects of media 
tones across the two subsamples, indicating that the printed media version of the news does not make a 
difference in investor reactions to online media content around operational risk event announcements. 
Finally, we rerun all our empirical analyses utilizing a logit model of the odds of reputational damage 
(i.e. having a negative RCAR) to capture the equity-based reputational effects and an OLS model of 
cumulative abnormal CDS relative spread changes (i.e. as computed in Sturm, 2013b) to capture the 
debt-based reputational effects. Again, the inferences drawn from our main results are confirmed by the 
alternative measures of reputational effects. 
                                                          
25 In the interests of brevity, our additional robustness checks are not reported but their full results are available 
upon request. 
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Overall, in all additional robustness checks, our main baseline and interaction results hold 
qualitatively similar, thus confirming our main conjecture that media tones have an incremental 
explanatory power for the reputational effects of operational risk event announcements in financial 
institutions. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We utilized the financial sentiment dictionary introduced by Loughran and McDonald (2011) to 
assess the reputational effects of the net negative tone, uncertainty tone, and litigious tone in a global 
sample of 305 operational risk event announcements in financial institutions extracted from the 
Operational Risk International Consortium (ORIC) database during the post-crisis period (2010 – 
2014). In particular, we examine the main and marginal effects of these tones on the loss-adjusted 
abnormal stock returns (i.e. reputational returns) and abnormal CDS spread changes (i.e. also used as a 
direct measure of the loss firm’s implied default risk) following operational risk event announcements. 
Our empirical analysis revealed a number of original findings. First, we found strong evidence that 
the net negative tone and litigious tone have adverse reputational effects and that the uncertainty tone 
has a favorable reputational impact following operational risk event announcements. On one side, 
capital market participants (i.e. investors in equity and debt markets) penalize loss firms for the adverse 
content and litigation risk related information in operational risk event announcements.  On the other 
side, investors give loss firms the benefit of the doubt (as proxied by the uncertainty tone in media 
news) following operational risk event announcements. Second, third-party information about the 
operational risk event (i.e. regulatory announcements and final settlements) dissolves the favorable 
reputational impact of the uncertainty tone and mitigates the adverse reputational impact of the litigious 
tone. Third, the reputational effects of media tones are much stronger in Anglo-Saxon countries (i.e. 
due to the cultural effects of linguistic communication) and market-based economies (i.e. due to more 
efficient capital markets). Fourth, loss amount disclosure and firm recognition substitute the 
reputational effects of the net negative tone and uncertainty tone only in Anglo-Saxon countries and 
market-based economies. Fifth, the reputational effects of online media content do not differ regardless 
of the availability of the news in printed format. Finally, the reputational effects of media tones 
following operational risk event announcements are most pronounced in the first post-announcement 
trading week and almost entirely fade away beyond the second post-announcement trading week. 
Our results provide robust evidence on how narratives in unexpected adverse media news can drive 
the financial sentiment of equity and debt investors. Hence, our results could inform market participants 
about developing more effective trading strategies that incorporate content analysis of online media 
news. In addition, policymakers and regulators could consider establishing media task forces that 
analyze the contents and effects of adverse media news in the financial industry, and recommend further 
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actions, including follow-up regulatory statements. Furthermore, financial institutions need to respond 
promptly to operational risk event announcements if they are to mitigate the reputational effects of 
media tone and help calm any investor concerns. This reinforces the need for careful media monitoring 
and objectivity when responding to loss event announcements. More specifically, our results suggest 
that, internal to financial institutions, risk managers should at least be much more involved and careful 
in the coordination of messages to the market when detailing the specifics of operational risk events 
within them.  
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Table 1: Sample Selection Procedures 
This table reports the selection criteria and procedure of our final sample comprising operational risk event announcements in publicly listed 
financial institutions incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, and Australia during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). 
Selection Procedure Observations 
Complete ORIC Database (March 2015) 16110 
(-) Announcements before 1st January 2010 (804) 
(-) Announcements after 31st December 2014 (99) 
(-) Announcements in non-financial Firms (2190) 
(-) Announcements in loss firms not headquartered in USA, Europe, Canada, and Australia (3653) 
(-) Announcements which have no clear operational risk classification (event type or business line) (5044) 
(-) Announcements whose dates are not confirmed or full-text press articles not found (3291) 
(-) Announcements in privately held financial firms (696) 
(-) Announcements with outliers in reputational returns (i.e. less than -10% or more than 10%) or abnormal CDS 
relative spread changes (i.e. less than -50% or more than 50%) in the event window (-10,+10) 
(28) 
Final Sample 305 
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Table 2: Composition of the Final Sample 
This table reports the composition of our final sample comprising operational risk event announcements in publicly listed financial institutions 
incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, and Australia during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). An Anglo-Saxon 
country is an English-speaking country. A Market-based economy has a Structure-Activity indicator of at least 1. According to (Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine, 2009), Structure-Activity indicator equals stock market value traded to GDP divided by bank credit to GDP (higher values of 
Structure-Activity indicate a more market-based financial structure). 
Panel A: By Country 
Country Number of Events Percent (%) 
Anglo-
Saxon? 
Structure-
Activity 
Indicator 
Market-based or 
Bank-based? 
Australia 13 4.26 YES 0.9 Bank-based 
Austria 3 0.98 NO 0.18 Bank-based 
Belgium 2 0.66 NO 0.46 Bank-based 
Canada 11 3.61 YES 0.62 Bank-based 
France 4 1.31 NO 0.97 Bank-based 
Germany 17 5.57 NO 0.7 Bank-based 
Hungary 3 0.98 NO 0.44 Bank-based 
Ireland 10 3.28 YES 0.17 Bank-based 
Italy 4 1.31 NO 0.64 Bank-based 
Netherlands 3 0.98 NO 0.85 Bank-based 
Norway 1 0.33 NO 0.79 Bank-based 
Russian Federation 2 0.66 NO 1.15  Market-based 
Spain 4 1.31 NO 0.89 Bank-based 
Sweden 2 0.66 NO 1.37 Market-based 
Switzerland 21 6.89 NO 1.73 Market-based 
Turkey 6 1.97 NO 1.52 Market-based 
United Kingdom 86 28.20 YES 1.25 Market-based 
United States 113 37.05 YES 1.45 Market-based 
Total 305 100    
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Table 2: Composition of the Final Sample 
This table reports the composition of our final sample comprising operational risk event announcements in publicly listed financial institutions 
incorporated in USA, Europe, Canada, and Australia during the post-global financial crisis (post-GFC) period (2010 – 2014). 
Panel B: By Industry Type 
Industry Type Number of Events 
Percent  
(%) 
Banks 47 15.41 
Consumer Finance 6 1.97 
Corporate Banking 3 0.98 
Diversified Banks 150 49.18 
Institutional Brokerage 20 6.56 
Institutional Trust, Fiduciary and Custody 5 1.64 
Insurance Brokers 6 1.97 
Investment Income - Life Insurance 7 2.30 
Investment Management 3 0.98 
Life Insurance 9 2.95 
Managed Care 2 0.66 
Mortgage Finance 2 0.66 
Other Financial Services 4 1.31 
Property and Casualty Insurance 5 1.64 
Retail Banking 18 5.90 
Wealth Management 18 5.90 
Total 305 100 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables tested. Variables description is reported 
in Appendix B. 
 
 Obs Min 25% Median Mean StDev 75% Max 
1) Equity-based Reputation Variables: 
RCAR(-10,-1) 305 -14.5018 -0.5955 0.4008 0.4369 2.0816 1.4607 8.8959 
RCAR(0,0) 305 -8.2222 -0.6759 0.1979 0.3087 1.8944 1.3136 7.2937 
RCAR(+1,+5) 305 -8.5050 -1.3486 -0.6481 -0.2858 2.3878 -0.0183 10.4541 
RCAR(+6,+10) 305 -4.7691 -1.9024 -0.7019 -0.1018 1.5486 1.3175 5.3876 
2) Debt-based Reputation Variables: 
CASC(-10,-1) 166 -3.0405 -0.1762 0.0160 0.2076 0.7724 0.2673 2.6794 
CASC(0,0) 166 -9.4620 -1.0630 0.2800 0.5825 3.4361 3.4150 11.1710 
CASC(+1,+5) 166 -137.9418 -38.3815 -5.6617 2.4040 52.3157 34.5607 183.4670 
CASC(+6,+10) 166 -64.8695 -4.3423 -0.0070 1.5589 15.8348 8.4196 53.7892 
3) Media Tone Variables:         
Net Negative Tone 305 0 45 54.8387 53.6645 14.0570 62.8571 90 
Uncertainty Tone 305 0 3.0769 7.5472 8.4136 7.5169 10.7143 41.1765 
Litigious Tone 305 0 19.6429 26.3158 26.0702 12.1593 33.3333 60 
4) Other Information Variables:        
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum 305 0 0 1 0.682 0.4665 1 1 
Firm Recognition Dum 305 0 0 0 0.3607 0.481 1 1 
Regulatory Announcement Dum 305 0 0 1 0.577 0.4948 1 1 
Settlement Dum 305 0 0 0 0.2197 0.4147 0 1 
5) Control Variables:         
Different Country Dum 305 0 0 0 0.2557 0.437 1 1 
Top Figures Dum 305 0 0 0 0.0754 0.2645 0 1 
Fraud Dum 305 0 0 0 0.1246 0.3308 0 1 
Basel Business Line Dum 305 0 1 1 0.7869 0.4102 1 1 
FT & WSJ Dum 305 0 0 0 0.482 0.5005 1 1 
Number of News Articles 305 1 1 6 14.8525 21.4437 19 98 
Analyst Coverage 305 1 18 24 22.7934 8.0467 29 37 
Credit Rating 166 3 6 7 6.8554 1.7898 7 12 
 StDev Ret 305 0.0084 0.0147 0.0205 0.0227 0.0104 0.0281 0.0766 
Beta 305 0.4387 1.2780 1.7454 1.8054 0.6965 2.27 4.4556 
Float% 305 0 61 92 77.7869 28.4356 100 100 
Ln(Volume) 305 -0.6931 8.3336 9.3957 9.0127 2.0156 10.2034 12.7171 
Ln(Total Assets) 305 6.4677 12.7863 14.1065 13.4791 1.5228 14.5596 14.8689 
ROA 305 -3.2781 -0.0121 0.3733 0.3768 0.9935 0.8012 7.1995 
Leverage 305 0 0.8425 1.3475 1.5928 0.9847 2.3037 5.4624 
Market to Book Ratio 305 0.26 0.61 0.84 1.0169 0.6694 1.19 4.79 
GDP Per Capita 305 10.646 42.295 49.781 48.976 13.519 52.828 100.575 
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Table 4: Event Study on the Equity-based Reputational Effects of Operational Risk Event Announcements 
This panel reports the average reputational returns (RCARs) for different event windows and various subsamples around operational risk event announcements. 
RCARs are reported as a percentage (%). Full Sample is composed of 305 events (Top25% subsample is composed of 77 events and Bottom75% sample is composed 
of 228 events). Top25% and Bottom75% subsamples include the events in the upper quartile and lowest three quartiles of the relevant media tone’s distribution, 
respectively. The Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) parametric test is used to test the statistical significance of the mean RCARs of the full, Top25% and 
Bottom75% samples (+, ++ and +++ indicate significance of the Z-statistic at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively). The cross-sectional parametric t-test is used 
to test the statistical significance of the differences in mean RCARs of the Top25% and Bottom75% subsamples (*, ** and *** indicate significance of the t-statistic 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively). Variables description is reported in Appendix B. 
  
Mean RCARs (%) 
(-10,-1) (0,0) (+1,+5) (+6,+10) 
Full Sample 0.4369++ 0.3087+ -0.2858++ -0.1018 
Net Negative Tone (Top25%) 0.2656+ -0.0913 -0.8627+++ -0.5425+++ 
Net Negative Tone (Bottom75%) 0.4948++ 0.4438++ -0.0909 0.0471 
Difference (Top25% - Bottom75%) -0.2292 -0.5351 -0.7718* -0.5896 
Uncertainty Tone (Top25%) 0.5627+++ 0.8043+++ 1.0252+++ 0.8321+++ 
Uncertainty Tone (Bottom75%) 0.3944++ 0.1413 -0.7286+++ -0.4173++ 
Difference (Top25% - Bottom75%) 0.1683 0.6630* 1.7538*** 1.2494*** 
Litigious Tone (Top25%) 0.5018+++ -0.0877 -0.9200+++ -0.6576+++ 
Litigious Tone (Bottom75%) 0.4150++ 0.4426++ -0.0716 0.0859 
Difference (Top25% - Bottom75%) 0.0868 -0.5303 -0.8484** -0.7435* 
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Table 5: Event Study on the Debt-based Reputational Effects of Operational Risk Event Announcements 
This panel reports the average cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes (CASCs) for different event windows and various subsamples around operational risk event 
announcements. CASCs are reported in basis points (bps). Full Sample is composed of 166 events (Top25% subsample is composed of 42 events and Bottom75% 
sample is composed of 124 events). Top25% and Bottom75% subsamples include the events in the upper quartile and lowest three quartiles of the relevant media 
tone’s distribution, respectively. The cross-sectional parametric t-test is used to test the statistical significance of the mean CASCs of the full, Top25% and 
Bottom75% samples and to test the statistical significance of the differences in mean CASCs of the Top25% and Bottom75% subsamples. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance of the t-statistic at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Variables description is reported in Appendix B. 
  
Mean CASCs (bps) 
(-10,-1) (0,0) (+1,+5) (+6,+10) 
Full Sample 0.2076 0.5825** 2.4040*** 1.5589*** 
Net Negative Tone (Top25%) 0.4073 1.0721*** 3.3053*** 2.0786*** 
Net Negative Tone (Bottom75%) 0.1400 0.4167 2.0987*** 1.3829*** 
Difference (Top25% - Bottom75%) 0.2673 0.6554 1.2066* 0.6957 
Uncertainty Tone (Top25%) 0.1267 -0.3582 0.7496** 0.3173 
Uncertainty Tone (Bottom75%) 0.2350 0.9011** 2.9643*** 1.9794*** 
Difference (Top25% - Bottom75%) -0.1083 -1.2593* -2.2147*** -1.6621** 
Litigious Tone (Top25%) 0.4296 1.1684*** 3.6200*** 2.4162*** 
Litigious Tone (Bottom75%) 0.1324 0.3841 1.9922*** 1.2685*** 
Difference (Top25% - Bottom75%) 0.2972 0.7843 1.6278** 1.1477* 
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Table 6: Baseline Regressions, Panel A: Reputational Returns 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational returns (RCARs) around operational risk event announcements for different event windows. 
Variables description is reported in Appendix B. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 RCAR(-10,-1) RCAR(0,0) RCAR(+1,+5) RCAR(+6,+10) 
Net Negative Tone -0.0083   -0.0194   -0.0385   -0.0227   
 (0.48)   (1.77)*   (3.05)***   (1.89)*   
Uncertainty Tone  0.0048   0.0283   0.0624   0.0427  
  (0.35)   (2.01)**   (4.40)***   (2.86)***  
Litigious Tone   0.0038   -0.0230   -0.0423   -0.0333 
   (0.19)   (2.26)**   (3.23)***   (2.65)*** 
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum -0.3401 -0.2791 -0.2918 0.2729 0.2909 0.2992 0.1529 0.1402 0.1414 0.3579 0.3030 0.3071 
 (1.04) (0.87) (0.90) (0.98) (1.04) (1.08) (0.45) (0.42) (0.42) (0.94) (0.79) (0.80) 
Firm Recognition Dum -0.1553 -0.2714 -0.2169 -0.0273 -0.0515 -0.1213 -0.0939 -0.1149 -0.1245 -0.1239 -0.0768 -0.1124 
 (0.23) (0.39) (0.31) (0.08) (0.16) (0.37) (0.24) (0.29) (0.31) (0.30) (0.18) (0.26) 
Regulatory Announcement Dum 0.1595 -0.0171 -0.0876 -0.3759 -0.4354 -0.5048 -0.1922 -0.1176 -0.1464 -0.5093 -0.3035 -0.2848 
 (0.33) (0.04) (0.20) (1.41) (1.67)* (1.94)* (0.56) (0.37) (0.46) (1.35) (0.86) (0.80) 
Settlement Dum 1.0593 1.0964 1.1374 0.3283 0.3408 0.3802 0.5623 0.5461 0.5609 0.2457 0.2022 0.1959 
 (1.37) (1.41) (1.43) (0.93) (0.96) (1.07) (1.16) (1.14) (1.17) (0.50) (0.42) (0.40) 
Different Country Dum -0.8800 -0.9550 -0.9579 -0.2259 -0.2482 -0.2584 -0.2550 -0.2369 -0.2391 -0.0374 0.0326 0.0295 
 (2.20)** (2.41)** (2.42)** (0.74) (0.82) (0.85) (0.64) (0.60) (0.60) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Top Figures Dum -1.5201 -1.4779 -1.4493 -0.0745 -0.0592 -0.0189 -0.6688 -0.6910 -0.6749 -0.3106 -0.3657 -0.3749 
 (1.47) (1.44) (1.40) (0.17) (0.13) (0.04) (1.29) (1.34) (1.31) (0.54) (0.65) (0.65) 
Fraud Dum -0.8174 -0.8398 -0.9659 0.1032 0.0833 0.0572 0.0648 0.1327 0.1082 0.0942 0.1933 0.2385 
 (1.11) (1.09) (1.28) (0.29) (0.23) (0.16) (0.13) (0.26) (0.21) (0.17) (0.35) (0.44) 
Basel Business Line Dum -0.1270 -0.0838 -0.1093 0.0955 0.1033 0.1390 -0.1698 -0.1561 -0.1507 0.1899 0.1797 0.1963 
 (0.23) (0.15) (0.20) (0.31) (0.33) (0.46) (0.48) (0.44) (0.42) (0.48) (0.45) (0.49) 
FT & WSJ Dum -0.0936 -0.0484 0.0339 0.3531 0.3777 0.3773 0.8895 0.8266 0.8388 1.1732 1.0654 1.0309 
 (0.18) (0.10) (0.07) (1.38) (1.51) (1.49) (2.75)*** (2.57)** (2.58)** (3.21)*** (2.93)*** (2.82)*** 
Number of News Articles -0.0323 -0.0343 -0.0344 -0.0084 -0.0089 -0.0099 -0.0125 -0.0123 -0.0126 -0.0092 -0.0077 -0.0079 
 (1.90)* (1.93)* (1.93)* (1.44) (1.51) (1.63) (1.70)* (1.66)* (1.67)* (1.10) (0.91) (0.92) 
Analyst Coverage 0.0324 0.0364 0.0311 0.0158 0.0165 0.0154 -0.0062 -0.0046 -0.0057 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0019 
 (0.79) (0.88) (0.75) (0.65) (0.68) (0.63) (0.19) (0.14) (0.17) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) 
 StDev Ret 0.2883 0.2749 0.2772 0.3365 0.3319 0.3366 0.2164 0.2222 0.2234 0.1426 0.1584 0.1591 
 (1.08) (1.01) (1.02) (1.76)* (1.74)* (1.77)* (1.14) (1.17) (1.18) (0.72) (0.79) (0.79) 
Beta 0.9794 1.0583 1.0760 -0.1557 -0.1328 -0.0955 0.2589 0.2422 0.2531 0.0639 -0.0067 -0.0040 
 (2.06)** (2.15)** (2.19)** (0.62) (0.54) (0.38) (0.76) (0.71) (0.75) (0.18) (0.02) (0.01) 
Float% -0.0088 -0.0079 -0.0074 -0.0117 -0.0114 -0.0109 -0.0096 -0.0101 -0.0098 -0.0072 -0.0083 -0.0084 
 (1.18) (1.05) (0.99) (2.04)** (2.00)** (1.93)* (1.34) (1.41) (1.40) (0.86) (0.99) (1.01) 
Ln(Volume) -0.0174 -0.0454 -0.0441 -0.0371 -0.0448 -0.0570 -0.1912 -0.1874 -0.1903 -0.1821 -0.1596 -0.1623 
 (0.17) (0.46) (0.45) (0.59) (0.71) (0.87) (2.18)** (2.11)** (2.12)** (2.05)** (1.74)* (1.77)* 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.0838 0.0978 0.0913 0.1799 0.1836 0.1801 0.4001 0.3991 0.3970 0.3956 0.3855 0.3882 
 (0.53) (0.62) (0.58) (1.11) (1.12) (1.11) (1.93)* (1.92)* (1.91)* (1.87)* (1.80)* (1.82)* 
ROA 0.1380 0.1306 0.1139 0.3919 0.3867 0.3941 0.4641 0.4799 0.4790 0.6843 0.7088 0.7177 
 (0.55) (0.51) (0.45) (1.66)* (1.63) (1.66)* (1.47) (1.52) (1.53) (2.26)** (2.35)** (2.39)** 
Leverage -0.3745 -0.4053 -0.3967 -0.0815 -0.0889 -0.1005 -0.1757 -0.1769 -0.1782 -0.1388 -0.1209 -0.1277 
 (1.25) (1.31) (1.30) (0.52) (0.57) (0.64) (0.94) (0.94) (0.94) (0.69) (0.59) (0.62) 
Market to Book Ratio -0.0268 0.0198 0.0555 -0.3767 -0.3578 -0.3546 -0.1133 -0.1479 -0.1417 -0.1025 -0.1754 -0.1898 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.15) (1.60) (1.49) (1.49) (0.35) (0.46) (0.44) (0.33) (0.54) (0.58) 
GDP Per Capita 0.0033 0.0041 0.0042 0.0017 0.0024 0.0031 0.0086 0.0082 0.0084 0.0089 0.0083 0.0087 
 (0.19) (0.27) (0.30) (0.16) (0.20) (0.34) (0.63) (0.63) (0.64) (0.59) (0.53) (0.53) 
CAR(-10,-1)    0.0488 0.0499 0.0509 0.0021 -0.0024 -0.0010 0.0452 0.0392 0.0361 
    (0.91) (0.93) (0.96) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.69) (0.57) (0.54) 
Constant -0.1680 -1.8276 -1.2594 -1.1689 -1.6474 -1.2102 -4.0654 -3.7434 -3.5418 -5.6488 -4.1925 -4.3667 
 (0.06) (0.63) (0.41) (0.55) (0.75) (0.54) (1.58) (1.40) (1.32) (2.18)** (1.61) (1.66)* 
R2 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.12 
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 
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Table 6: Baseline Regressions, Panel B: Abnormal CDS Spread Changes 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression model estimating the cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes (CASCs) around operational risk event 
announcements for different event windows. Variables description is reported in Appendix B. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
  
 CASC(-10,-1) CASC(0,0) CASC(+1,+5) CASC(+6,+10) 
Net Negative Tone 0.0115   0.0248   0.0492   0.0283   
 (0.73)   (1.29)   (2.45)**   (1.61)   
Uncertainty Tone  -0.0077   -0.0597   -0.0921   -0.0710  
  (0.60)   (2.98)***   (4.27)***   (3.72)***  
Litigious Tone   0.0138   0.0378   0.0613   0.0469 
   (0.53)   (1.69)*   (2.85)***   (2.29)** 
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum -0.5416 -0.6571 -0.6519 -0.3589 -0.4135 -0.4201 -0.0125 0.0198 0.0208 -0.4342 -0.4199 -0.4173 
 (0.29) (0.36) (0.35) (0.57) (0.67) (0.68) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.39) (0.37) (0.37) 
Firm Recognition Dum -0.8391 -1.0084 -1.0097 -1.1381 -0.9686 -0.8290 -3.2134 -3.2533 -3.3011 -2.4382 -2.4982 -2.5520 
 (0.36) (0.43) (0.42) (1.12) (0.98) (0.80) (2.58)** (2.64)*** (2.58)** (1.38) (1.42) (1.39) 
Regulatory Announcement Dum 1.0824 1.7247 1.2949 -0.8387 -0.6675 -0.3702 0.1096 -0.0218 -0.0755 0.2537 0.2166 0.0996 
 (0.56) (0.86) (0.68) (1.20) (0.96) (0.52) (0.12) (0.02) (0.09) (0.21) (0.18) (0.08) 
Settlement Dum 1.2519 0.7384 1.1673 0.8083 0.6238 0.2977 1.6962 1.8159 1.8818 0.9586 1.0042 1.1322 
 (0.46) (0.29) (0.43) (0.68) (0.54) (0.26) (1.13) (1.24) (1.24) (0.48) (0.52) (0.57) 
Different Country Dum -0.7672 -0.4458 -0.6722 -0.6514 -0.7470 -0.6990 -0.9056 -0.9068 -0.8998 -0.2132 -0.1733 -0.1930 
 (0.42) (0.24) (0.36) (0.87) (1.01) (0.95) (0.85) (0.83) (0.85) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) 
Top Figures Dum 1.7812 1.5942 1.8156 -1.3267 -1.2439 -1.3260 0.8837 0.8736 0.8798 0.8815 0.8497 0.8825 
 (0.53) (0.48) (0.55) (1.20) (1.15) (1.21) (0.72) (0.70) (0.70) (0.58) (0.55) (0.57) 
Fraud Dum -2.4684 -1.6903 -2.0280 1.1684 1.1934 1.2689 0.9538 0.8619 0.8698 1.1538 1.1670 1.1363 
 (0.90) (0.67) (0.78) (1.38) (1.45) (1.50) (0.86) (0.81) (0.80) (0.83) (0.86) (0.82) 
Basel Business Line Dum 1.1102 1.1885 1.1716 0.8175 0.7431 0.7005 -0.7887 -0.7723 -0.7550 -0.0979 -0.0713 -0.0550 
 (0.46) (0.50) (0.51) (1.30) (1.17) (1.13) (0.86) (0.84) (0.81) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04) 
FT & WSJ Dum -2.0471 -2.2863 -2.2702 1.1888 1.1183 1.1186 -0.1799 -0.1270 -0.1311 -0.4094 -0.3938 -0.3938 
 (1.16) (1.24) (1.22) (1.82)* (1.71)* (1.73)* (0.20) (0.14) (0.15) (0.35) (0.34) (0.34) 
Number of News Articles -0.0222 -0.0238 -0.0241 0.0051 0.0080 0.0102 0.0314 0.0306 0.0298 -0.0289 -0.0299 -0.0308 
 (0.50) (0.54) (0.52) (0.41) (0.65) (0.81) (2.03)** (1.99)** (1.89)* (1.13) (1.14) (1.13) 
Analyst Coverage -0.3312 -0.3290 -0.3276 0.1239 0.1306 0.1306 0.0888 0.0866 0.0861 -0.0504 -0.0526 -0.0525 
 (1.54) (1.52) (1.50) (1.46) (1.56) (1.57) (0.72) (0.69) (0.69) (0.34) (0.36) (0.36) 
Credit Rating 3.0761 2.8959 2.9376 -0.1356 -0.0925 -0.0356 0.2184 0.2203 0.1998 0.2264 0.2081 0.1862 
 (2.64)*** (2.49)** (2.62)*** (0.28) (0.19) (0.07) (0.31) (0.32) (0.28) (0.25) (0.23) (0.20) 
StDev Ret 0.6912 0.8582 0.7581 -0.5200 -0.5111 -0.4616 0.6686 0.6464 0.6411 -0.1718 -0.1698 -0.1895 
 (0.48) (0.59) (0.53) (1.48) (1.47) (1.35) (1.14) (1.10) (1.08) (0.24) (0.23) (0.26) 
Beta -4.4566 -4.2909 -4.2661 0.6022 0.5580 0.4386 1.5374 1.5388 1.5720 0.8819 0.8998 0.9463 
 (2.52)** (2.42)** (2.34)** (0.80) (0.76) (0.58) (1.75)* (1.76)* (1.73)* (0.75) (0.76) (0.76) 
Ln(Total Assets) -6.4550 -6.2739 -6.4997 0.0799 0.0764 0.1813 1.7148 1.7021 1.6840 0.1449 0.1496 0.1082 
 (3.32)*** (3.18)*** (3.44)*** (0.13) (0.12) (0.30) (2.19)** (2.17)** (2.13)** (0.13) (0.14) (0.10) 
ROA -0.6174 -0.6404 -0.7711 0.3778 0.4280 0.5725 2.2509 2.2365 2.2008 1.5487 1.5317 1.4753 
 (0.22) (0.23) (0.28) (0.50) (0.58) (0.74) (1.99)** (1.98)** (1.88)* (1.05) (1.03) (0.94) 
Leverage -2.6980 -2.6034 -2.6961 -0.1847 -0.1919 -0.1581 -0.0192 -0.0246 -0.0289 -1.2128 -1.2084 -1.2218 
 (1.64) (1.59) (1.64) (0.52) (0.53) (0.44) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (1.66)* (1.64) (1.67)* 
Market to Book Ratio -4.5824 -4.6987 -4.7367 1.5420 1.5838 1.6456 1.6296 1.6320 1.6105 -0.0274 -0.0453 -0.0692 
 (1.70)* (1.77)* (1.76)* (1.65) (1.69)* (1.79)* (1.35) (1.36) (1.32) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
GDP Per Capita 0.0769 0.0842 0.0871 0.0320 0.0298 0.0237 0.0731 0.0734 0.0751 0.0808 0.0810 0.0842 
 (0.63) (0.70) (0.69) (1.39) (1.26) (0.94) (1.93)* (1.95)* (1.97)* (1.42) (1.44) (1.45) 
CASC(-10,-1)    0.0345 0.0403 0.0376 0.0083 0.0072 0.0071 -0.0750 -0.0771 -0.0760 
    (0.95) (1.14) (1.09) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (1.33) (1.37) (1.35) 
Constant 91.5018 89.9698 95.8239 -7.8997 -6.3179 -9.5231 -35.5646 -36.0342 -35.4738 -3.3373 -3.8717 -2.6093 
 (2.70)*** (2.66)*** (3.03)*** (0.64) (0.51) (0.81) (2.20)** (2.26)** (2.16)** (0.16) (0.19) (0.13) 
R2 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.14 
N 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 
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Table 7: Interactions with Loss Amount Disclosure 
This table reports the results of the interactions with loss amount disclosure (Loss Amount Disclosure Dum) for: i) the OLS regression model estimating the equity-
based reputational returns (RCARs) and ii) the OLS regression model estimating the cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes (CASCs) around operational risk 
event announcements for different event windows. In the interests of brevity, the constant term and all other variables are not reported. Variables description is 
reported in Appendix B. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
 
i) Reputational Returns: RCAR(-10,-1) RCAR(0,0) RCAR(+1,+5) RCAR(+6,+10) 
Net Negative Tone -0.0129   -0.0295   -0.0415   -0.0345   
 (0.42)   (1.05)   (1.46)   (1.14)   
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum * Net Negative Tone 0.0058   0.0126   0.0038   0.0148   
 (0.16)   (0.41)   (0.17)   (0.43)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.0054   0.0496   0.1144   0.0702  
  (0.17)   (1.38)   (3.17)***   (1.90)*  
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum * Uncertainty Tone  -0.0009   -0.0324   -0.0789   -0.0418  
  (0.04)   (0.76)   (1.79)*   (0.91)  
Litigious Tone   0.0076   -0.0306   -0.0688   -0.0420 
   (0.23)   (1.26)   (2.78)***   (1.71)* 
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum * Litigious Tone   -0.0053   0.0105   0.0367   0.0120 
   (0.15)   (0.42)   (1.34)   (0.45) 
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum -0.6636 -0.2719 -0.1525 -0.4291 0.5495 0.0204 -0.0606 0.7699 -0.8326 -0.4641 0.6366 -0.0119 
 (0.33) (0.18) (0.21) (0.27) (1.29) (0.08) (0.05) (1.85)* (0.98) (0.36) (1.38) (0.03) 
R2 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 
ii) Abnormal CDS Spread Changes: CASC(-10,-1) CASC(0,0) CASC(+1,+5) CASC(+6,+10) 
Net Negative Tone 0.0119   0.0325   0.0761   0.0421   
 (0.20)   (0.65)   (1.47)   (0.76)   
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum * Net Negative Tone -0.0005   -0.0101   -0.0352   -0.0179   
 (0.03)   (0.15)   (0.44)   (0.19)   
Uncertainty Tone  -0.0088   -0.1625   -0.3822   -0.2517  
  (0.13)   (2.19)**   (5.04)***   (3.31)***  
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum * Uncertainty Tone  0.0015   0.1436   0.4052   0.2525  
  (0.02)   (0.81)   (2.27)**   (1.36)  
Litigious Tone   0.0158   0.0487   0.0946   0.0669 
   (0.31)   (1.09)   (2.08)**   (1.40) 
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum * Litigious Tone   -0.0031   -0.0164   -0.0502   -0.0302 
   (0.05)   (0.13)   (0.39)   (0.17) 
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum -0.5130 -0.6697 -0.5753 0.1880 -1.5877 -0.0093 1.8956 -3.2928 1.2742 0.5394 -2.4841 0.3375 
 (0.04) (0.71) (0.28) (0.07) (1.78)* (0.01) (0.51) (3.25)*** (0.33) (0.18) (2.74)*** (0.10) 
R2 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.14 0.15 0.14 
N 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 
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Table 8: Interactions with Firm Recognition 
This table reports the results of the interactions with firm recognition (Firm Recognition Dum) for: i) the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based 
reputational returns (RCARs) and ii) the OLS regression model estimating the cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes (CASCs) around operational risk event 
announcements for different event windows. In the interests of brevity, the constant term and all other variables are not reported. Variables description is reported in 
Appendix B. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
  
i) Reputational Returns: RCAR(-10,-1) RCAR(0,0) RCAR(+1,+5) RCAR(+6,+10) 
Net Negative Tone -0.0101   -0.0274   -0.0558   -0.0363   
 (0.51)   (1.38)   (2.71)***   (1.76)*   
Firm Recognition Dum * Net Negative Tone 0.0036   0.0166   0.0359   0.0283   
 (0.12)   (0.61)   (1.42)   (1.07)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.0055   0.0414   0.0957   0.0685  
  (0.26)   (1.96)**   (4.45)***   (3.18)***  
Firm Recognition Dum * Uncertainty Tone  -0.0014   -0.0254   -0.0647   -0.0501  
  (0.07)   (0.92)   (2.40)**   (1.88)*  
Litigious Tone   0.0047   -0.0327   -0.0532   -0.0499 
   (0.29)   (2.23)**   (3.62)***   (2.96)*** 
Firm Recognition Dum * Litigious Tone   -0.0021   0.0227   0.0255   0.0385 
   (0.09)   (0.86)   (0.95)   (1.37) 
Firm Recognition Dum -0.3449 -0.2590 -0.1651 -0.8952 0.1742 -0.6856 -1.9684 0.4601 -0.7583 -1.5988 0.3682 -1.0717 
 (0.27) (0.31) (0.15) (0.62) (0.39) (0.58) (1.41) (1.16) (0.62) (1.23) (0.92) (0.87) 
R2 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.12 
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 
ii) Abnormal CDS Spread Changes: CASC(-10,-1) CASC(0,0) CASC(+1,+5) CASC(+6,+10) 
Net Negative Tone 0.0121   0.0343   0.0827   0.0524   
 (0.14)   (0.33)   (0.79)   (0.45)   
Firm Recognition Dum * Net Negative Tone -0.0013   -0.0223   -0.0784   -0.0563   
 (0.03)   (0.38)   (1.41)   (1.05)   
Uncertainty Tone  -0.0086   -0.0999   -0.1825   -0.1344  
  (0.23)   (2.46)**   (4.04)***   (2.93)***  
Firm Recognition Dum * Uncertainty Tone  0.0021   0.0955   0.2146   0.1507  
  (0.05)   (1.76)*   (3.82)***   (2.65)***  
Litigious Tone   0.0135   0.0418   0.0872   0.0642 
   (0.44)   (1.32)   (2.78)***   (1.97)** 
Firm Recognition Dum * Litigious Tone   0.0010   -0.0126   -0.0814   -0.0544 
   (0.01)   (0.15)   (1.08)   (0.70) 
Firm Recognition Dum -0.7708 -1.0277 -1.0309 0.0462 -1.8394 -0.5460 0.9428 -5.2097 -1.4769 0.5476 -3.8727 -1.3313 
 (0.06) (1.01) (0.36) (0.03) (1.88)* (0.19) (0.12) (4.77)*** (0.45) (0.08) (3.42)*** (0.45) 
R2 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.15 0.14 
N 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 
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Table 9: Interactions with Regulatory Announcement 
This table reports the results of the interactions with regulatory announcement (Regulatory Announcement Dum) for: i) the OLS regression model estimating the 
equity-based reputational returns (RCARs) and ii) the OLS regression model estimating the cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes (CASCs) around operational 
risk event announcements for different event windows. In the interests of brevity, the constant term and all other variables are not reported. Variables description is 
reported in Appendix B. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 
  
i) Reputational Returns: RCAR(-10,-1) RCAR(0,0) RCAR(+1,+5) RCAR(+6,+10) 
Net Negative Tone -0.0083   -0.0216   -0.0466   -0.0291   
 (0.77)   (1.98)**   (3.82)***   (2.51)**   
Regulatory Announcement Dum * Net Negative Tone -0.0001   0.0059   0.0215   0.0171   
 (0.02)   (0.31)   (1.32)   (1.02)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.0055   0.0478   0.1147   0.0798  
  (0.21)   (1.60)   (3.13)***   (2.22)**  
Regulatory Announcement Dum * Uncertainty Tone  -0.0017   -0.0466   -0.1249   -0.0886  
  (0.03)   (1.00)   (2.38)**   (1.70)*  
Litigious Tone   0.0034   -0.0390   -0.0818   -0.0614 
   (0.19)   (2.39)**   (4.11)***   (3.34)*** 
Regulatory Announcement Dum * Litigious Tone   0.0009   0.0391   0.0963   0.0685 
   (0.07)   (1.94)*   (3.47)***   (2.73)*** 
Regulatory Announcement Dum 0.1662 -0.0032 -0.1108 -0.6918 -0.0529 -1.5379 -1.3414 0.9067 -2.6921 -1.4219 0.4235 -2.0951 
 (0.12) (0.03) (0.17) (0.76) (0.15) (2.62)*** (1.48) (1.68)* (3.57)*** (1.58) (0.79) (3.06)*** 
R2 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.12 
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 
ii) Abnormal CDS Spread Changes: CASC(-10,-1) CASC(0,0) CASC(+1,+5) CASC(+6,+10) 
Net Negative Tone 0.0109   0.0284   0.0679   0.0414   
 (0.14)   (0.25)   (0.74)   (0.35)   
Regulatory Announcement Dum * Net Negative Tone 0.0015   -0.0086   -0.0446   -0.0310   
 (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.38)   (0.20)   
Uncertainty Tone  -0.0091   -0.0848   -0.1811   -0.1342  
  (0.22)   (1.82)*   (3.50)***   (2.44)**  
Regulatory Announcement Dum * Uncertainty Tone  0.0033   0.0610   0.2165   0.1541  
  (0.05)   (0.88)   (2.86)***   (2.05)**  
Litigious Tone   0.0152   0.0602   0.1242   0.0917 
   (0.61)   (1.95)*   (3.20)***   (2.54)** 
Regulatory Announcement Dum * Litigious Tone   -0.0035   -0.0529   -0.1485   -0.1060 
   (0.04)   (0.65)   (1.80)*   (1.29) 
Regulatory Announcement Dum 1.0042 1.6993 1.3838 -0.3758 -1.1306 0.9741 2.4987 -1.6648 3.6972 1.9159 -0.9527 2.7939 
 (0.11) (0.95) (0.26) (0.28) (0.40) (0.19) (0.53) (0.67) (0.85) (0.29) (0.35) (0.54) 
R2 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.14 0.14 0.14 
N 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 
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Table 10: Interactions with Settlement 
This table reports the results of the interactions with settlement (Settlement Dum) for: i) the OLS regression model estimating the equity-based reputational returns 
(RCARs) and ii) the OLS regression model estimating the cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes (CASCs) around operational risk event announcements for 
different event windows. In the interests of brevity, the constant term and all other variables are not reported. Variables description is reported in Appendix B. t-
statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 
  
i) Reputational Returns: RCAR(-10,-1) RCAR(0,0) RCAR(+1,+5) RCAR(+6,+10) 
Net Negative Tone -0.0090   -0.0243   -0.0476   -0.0328   
 (0.45)   (1.32)   (2.53)**   (1.70)*   
Settlement Dum * Net Negative Tone 0.0027   0.0186   0.0346   0.0383   
 (0.11)   (0.59)   (1.21)   (1.32)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.0046   0.0440   0.1147   0.0726  
  (0.16)   (1.39)   (3.27)***   (2.08)**  
Settlement Dum * Uncertainty Tone  0.0004   -0.0455   -0.1515   -0.0866  
  (0.01)   (1.54)   (4.39)***   (2.81)***  
Litigious Tone   0.0044   -0.0364   -0.0882   -0.0628 
   (0.24)   (2.20)**   (4.55)***   (3.31)*** 
Settlement Dum * Litigious Tone   -0.0029   0.0689   0.2363   0.1511 
   (0.08)   (1.98)**   (5.67)***   (3.46)*** 
Settlement Dum 0.9168 1.0920 1.1990 -0.6369 0.8144 -1.1032 -1.2308 2.1233 -4.5249 -1.7355 1.1035 -3.0567 
 (0.74) (1.23) (0.95) (0.46) (0.92) (0.84) (0.89) (2.33)** (2.66)*** (1.26) (1.20) (1.84)* 
R2 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.12 
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 
ii) Abnormal CDS Spread Changes: CASC(-10,-1) CASC(0,0) CASC(+1,+5) CASC(+6,+10) 
Net Negative Tone 0.0139   0.0351   0.0735   0.0507   
 (0.18)   (0.38)   (0.80)   (0.49)   
Settlement Dum * Net Negative Tone -0.0103   -0.0431   -0.1017   -0.0932   
 (0.13)   (0.50)   (1.19)   (1.04)   
Uncertainty Tone  -0.0091   -0.1072   -0.2067   -0.1469  
  (0.14)   (1.79)*   (3.18)***   (2.41)**  
Settlement Dum * Uncertainty Tone  0.0048   0.1576   0.3807   0.2526  
  (0.06)   (2.08)**   (5.23)***   (3.94)***  
Litigious Tone   0.0141   0.0404   0.0827   0.0689 
   (0.56)   (1.66)*   (3.03)***   (2.39)** 
Settlement Dum * Litigious Tone   -0.0029   -0.0202   -0.1648   -0.1701 
   (0.04)   (0.21)   (1.90)*   (2.04)** 
Settlement Dum 1.7582 0.6925 1.2419 2.9251 -0.8980 0.8063 6.6969 -1.8593 6.0354 5.5399 -1.4344 5.4179 
 (0.71) (0.23) (0.27) (1.20) (0.67) (0.18) (2.89)*** (1.45) (1.19) (2.32)** (0.99) (1.02) 
R2 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.14 0.14 0.14 
N 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 166 
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Table 11: Robustness Checks: Linguistic Communication 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression models estimating the equity-based reputational returns (RCARs) and cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes 
(CASCs) around operational risk event announcements in the event window (+1,+5) for the Anglo-Saxon and non-Anglo-Saxon countries (See Table 2, Panel A for 
a list of countries and their classifications). In the interests of brevity, the constant term and all other variables are not reported. Variables description is reported in 
Appendix B. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 RCAR(+1,+5) CASC(+1,+5) 
Anglo-Saxon Non-Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxon Non-Anglo-Saxon 
i) Baseline Regressions:             
Net Negative Tone -0.0804   -0.0209   0.1089   0.0179   
 (5.32)***   (0.96)   (3.06)***   (0.63)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.1452   0.0399   -0.2150   -0.0482  
  (5.76)***   (1.72)*   (5.23)***   (1.82)*  
Litigious Tone   -0.0948   -0.0268   0.1324   0.0340 
   (5.51)***   (1.38)   (3.69)***   (1.08) 
ii) Interactions with Loss Amount Disclosure:             
Net Negative Tone -0.1731   -0.0333   0.1997   0.0296   
 (5.98)***   (1.31)   (1.99)**   (0.35)   
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum *  Net Negative Tone 0.1181   0.0140   -0.1214   -0.0143   
 (2.54)**   (0.50)   (1.68)*   (0.30)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.3216   0.0794   -0.3796   -0.0847  
  (4.92)***   (2.18)**   (1.87)*   (0.57)  
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum  * Uncertainty Tone  -0.2840   -0.0440   0.2359   0.0391  
  (5.54)***   (1.04)   (1.66)*   (0.35)  
Litigious Tone   -0.1147   -0.0438   0.2129   0.0506 
   (3.90)***   (1.70)*   (2.16)**   (0.50) 
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum  * Litigious Tone   0.0284   0.0222   -0.1163   -0.0232 
   (0.92)   (0.80)   (1.38)   0.29 
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum -6.2623 2.7065 -0.5877 -0.5976 0.4587 -0.3067 7.1693 -1.6559 3.2945 -0.0447 -0.7548 0.0667 
 (4.88)*** (4.29)*** (0.79) (0.45) (0.69) (0.41) (1.17) (0.54) (1.36) (0.02) (0.27) (0.05) 
iii) Interactions with Firm Recognition:             
Net Negative Tone -0.1378   -0.0323   0.2030   0.0323   
 (4.27)***   (1.71)*   (3.61)***   (0.63)   
Firm Recognition Dum  * Net Negative Tone 0.1123   0.0310   -0.1968   -0.0676   
 (2.53)**   (0.87)   (2.97)***   (1.04)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.2672   0.0743   -0.4154   -0.0831  
  (4.14)***   (1.32)   (4.69)***   (0.88)  
Firm Recognition Dum  * Uncertainty Tone  -0.2325   -0.0651   0.4781   0.0791  
  (3.40)***   (1.51)   (2.13)**   (0.54)  
Litigious Tone   -0.1060   -0.0561   0.1861   0.0522 
   (3.15)***   (1.76)*   (2.38)**   (0.60) 
Firm Recognition Dum *  Litigious Tone   0.0259   0.0812   -0.1685   -0.0592 
   (0.37)   (0.84)   (1.13)   (0.36) 
Firm Recognition Dum -5.5607 2.5636 -0.3785 -3.0093 -1.2169 -4.1052 6.1966 -9.0981 -0.4475 1.4692 -2.0334 0.2313 
 (3.29)*** (3.80)*** (0.26) (1.72)* (1.11) (2.47)** (1.52) (4.18)*** (0.29) (0.37) (0.96) (0.08) 
N 233 233 233 72 72 72 126 126 126 40 40 40 
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Table 11: Robustness Checks: Linguistic Communication (Continued) 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression models estimating the equity-based reputational returns (RCARs) and cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes 
(CASCs) around operational risk event announcements in the event window (+1,+5) for the Anglo-Saxon and Non-Anglo-Saxon countries (See Table 2, Panel A for 
a list of countries and their classifications). In the interests of brevity, the constant term and all other variables are not reported. Variables description is reported in 
Appendix B. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 
  
 RCAR(+1,+5) CASC(+1,+5) 
Anglo-Saxon Non-Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxon Non-Anglo-Saxon 
iv) Interactions with Regulatory Announcement:             
Net Negative Tone -0.0927   -0.0285   0.1878   0.0304   
 (4.24)***   (1.58)   (2.78)***   (0.71)   
Regulatory Announcement Dum *  Net Negative Tone 0.0380   0.0133   -0.2020   -0.0704   
 (1.31)   (0.47)   (0.91)   (0.28)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.2324   0.0984   -0.4569   -0.1979  
  (5.78)***   (1.98)**   (5.45)***   (2.40)**  
Regulatory Announcement Dum *  Uncertainty Tone  -0.2351   -0.0897   0.7345   0.2536  
  (4.85)***   (1.89)*   (5.14)***   (1.74)  
Litigious Tone   -0.1460   -0.0563   0.3081   0.0835 
   (4.52)***   (1.70)*   (5.24)***   (1.69)* 
Regulatory Announcement Dum  * Litigious Tone   0.1299   0.0641   -0.4262   -0.1436 
   (3.62)***   (1.89)*   (4.22)***   (1.76)* 
Regulatory Announcement Dum -2.3431 1.8187 -3.6271 -0.8018 0.7272 -2.0003 12.0754 -4.9756 11.4475 1.8464 -3.5798 2.2955 
 (1.63) (2.04)** (1.82)* (0.58) (0.80) (1.08) (0.99) (2.36)** (2.42)** (0.17) (1.70)* (0.51) 
v) Interactions with Settlement:             
Net Negative Tone -0.0967   -0.0277   0.1364   0.0217   
 (3.38)***   (0.98)   (3.44)***   (0.51)   
Settlement Dum  * Net Negative Tone 0.0578   0.0290   -0.1040   -0.0941   
 (1.46)   (0.69)   (1.16)   (1.14)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.3423   0.1074   -0.4983   -0.1730  
  (5.77)***   (1.84)*   (5.98)***   (2.35)**  
Settlement Dum  * Uncertainty Tone  -0.5768   -0.1328   1.1061   0.2811  
  (7.85)***   (3.85)***   (6.70)***   (1.96)**  
Litigious Tone   -0.1376   -0.0508   0.1868   0.0695 
   (4.17)***   (2.22)**   (4.06)***   (1.73)* 
Settlement Dum *  Litigious Tone   0.2107   0.1337   -0.4508   -0.1960 
   (4.15)***   (3.27)***   (4.59)***   (1.69)* 
Settlement Dum -2.2669 6.6523 -3.8403 -1.6032 0.8188 -3.0215 7.2562 -8.9299 13.4465 6.0540 0.0406 7.3786 
 (1.86)* (5.86)*** (3.01)*** (1.27) (1.20) (2.47)** (1.62) (3.67)*** (4.55)*** (1.48) (0.01) (2.48)** 
N 233 233 233 72 72 72 126 126 126 40 40 40 
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Table 12: Robustness Checks: Financial Structure 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression models estimating the equity-based reputational returns (RCARs) and cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes 
(CASCs) around operational risk event announcements in the event window (+1,+5) for the market-based and bank-based economies (See Table 2, Panel A for a list 
of countries and their classifications). In the interests of brevity, the constant term and all other variables are not reported. Variables description is reported in 
Appendix B. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
 RCAR(+1,+5) CASC(+1,+5) 
Market-based Bank-based Market-based Bank-based 
i) Baseline Regressions:             
Net Negative Tone -0.0635   -0.0105   0.0816   0.0480   
 (4.22)***   (0.73)   (2.35)**   (1.41)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.1113   0.0420   -0.1643   0.0698  
  (5.05)***   (2.10)**   (5.14)**   (2.61)***  
Litigious Tone   -0.0748   -0.0323   0.1032   0.0424 
   (4.43)***   (1.71)*   (2.70)***   (1.22) 
ii) Interactions with Loss Amount Disclosure:             
Net Negative Tone -0.1421   -0.0161   0.2092   0.0854   
 (5.61)***   (0.79)   (2.13)**   (0.83)   
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum  * Net Negative Tone 0.0988   0.0064   -0.1663   -0.0425   
 (1.98)**   (0.17)   (1.89)*   (0.50)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.2630   0.0709   -0.4182   -0.1837  
  (2.73)***   (0.77)   (2.15)**   (0.91)  
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum  * Uncertainty Tone  -0.2547   -0.0327   0.3604   0.2850  
  (5.29)***   (0.83)   (1.75)*   (1.36)  
Litigious Tone   -0.0936   -0.0470   0.1853   0.0702 
   (3.16)***   (1.60)   (2.01)**   (0.77) 
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum  * Litigious Tone   0.0256   0.0198   -0.1176   -0.0540 
   (0.79)   (0.67)   (0.58)   (0.24) 
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum -4.9745 2.6632 -0.0709 -0.2523 0.2628 -0.5240 9.4173 -3.0113 3.0902 2.3212 -0.8801 1.6695 
 (4.07)*** (4.58)*** (0.08) (0.19) (0.48) (0.40) (1.46) (0.99) (0.65) (0.33) (0.25) (0.38) 
iii) Interactions with Firm Recognition:             
Net Negative Tone -0.1262   -0.0143   0.1581   0.0691   
 (3.70)***   (0.41)   (3.12)***   (1.41)   
Firm Recognition Dum *  Net Negative Tone 0.1345   0.0074   -0.1691   -0.0892   
 (2.68)***   (0.17)   (2.62)***   (1.36)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.2854   0.0640   -0.3399   -0.1390  
  (4.51)***   (1.24)   (4.05)***   (1.68)*  
Firm Recognition Dum  * Uncertainty Tone  -0.3713   -0.0299   0.4710   0.4182  
  (4.26)***   (0.42)   (1.78)*   (1.51)  
Litigious Tone   -0.0970   -0.0459   0.1315   0.0724 
   (2.72)***   (1.31)   (2.77)***   (1.57) 
Firm Recognition Dum  * Litigious Tone   0.0572   0.0237   -0.0951   -0.0872 
   (1.11)   (0.43)   (1.26)   (1.13) 
Firm Recognition Dum -6.9447 3.4643 -1.2425 -1.4004 -1.1100 -2.0818 4.8077 -9.0999 -2.0916 1.3728 -5.5466 -0.3965 
 (4.71)*** (5.12)*** (0.78) (0.96) (1.18) (1.35) (0.56) (4.27)*** (0.96) (0.26) (2.55)** (0.17) 
N 230 230 230 75 75 75 117 117 117 49 49 49 
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Table 12: Robustness Checks: Financial Structure (Continued) 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression models estimating the equity-based reputational returns (RCARs) and cumulative abnormal CDS spread changes 
(CASCs) around operational risk event announcements in the event window (+1,+5) for the market-based and bank-based economies (See Table 2, Panel A for a list 
of countries and their classifications). In the interests of brevity, the constant term and all other variables are not reported. Variables description is reported in 
Appendix B. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
 
  
 RCAR(+1,+5) CASC(+1,+5) 
Market-based Bank-based Market-based Bank-based 
iv) Interactions with Regulatory Announcement:             
Net Negative Tone -0.0770   -0.0161   0.1250   0.0679   
 (3.60)***   (0.92)   (1.69)*   (0.95)   
Regulatory Announcement Dum *  Net Negative Tone 0.0385   0.0129   -0.1060   -0.0990   
 (1.41)   (0.49)   (0.66)   (0.58)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.1811   0.0725   -0.3522   -0.1687  
  (5.41)***   (3.37)***   (4.40)***   (2.24)**  
Regulatory Announcement Dum *  Uncertainty Tone  -0.1597   -0.0937   0.5653   0.3387  
  (3.14)***   (1.96)**   (3.86)***   (2.37)**  
Litigious Tone   -0.1173   -0.0528   0.1992   0.0887 
   (4.08)***   (1.90)*   (3.53)***   (2.02)** 
Regulatory Announcement Dum *  Litigious Tone   0.1019   0.0664   -0.2460   -0.1310 
   (3.11)***   (2.06)**   (2.96)***   (1.67)* 
Regulatory Announcement Dum -1.9654 1.3271 -2.5191 -1.0621 0.6120 -2.1963 6.7163 -3.5145 6.9901 3.0010 -4.5996 1.1426 
 (1.34) (2.35)** (2.89)*** (0.74) (1.15) (2.52)** (1.62) (2.28)** (3.16)*** (0.71) (2.76)*** (0.57) 
v) Interactions with Settlement:             
Net Negative Tone -0.0683   -0.0135   0.1314   0.0631   
 (2.31)**   (0.47)   (3.26)***   (1.55)   
Settlement Dum  * Net Negative Tone 0.0186   0.0126   -0.1954   -0.2438   
 (0.49)   (0.36)   (1.00)   (1.18)   
Uncertainty Tone  0.2654   0.0925   -0.4329   -0.1765  
  (5.08)***   (2.47)**   (5.63)***   (2.63)***  
Settlement Dum  * Uncertainty Tone  -0.4548   -0.1182   1.2052   0.4848  
  (6.93)***   (2.88)***   (7.18)***   (3.35)***  
Litigious Tone   -0.0943   -0.0536   0.1925   0.1095 
   (3.24)***   (1.89)*   (4.58)***   (2.67)*** 
Settlement Dum  * Litigious Tone   0.1041   0.1010   -0.7848   -0.6910 
   (2.60)***   (2.49)**   (5.56)***   (4.65)*** 
Settlement Dum -0.5630 4.7603 -1.9099 0.9955 3.1709 -0.6085 11.7576 -9.4657 22.3567 12.9357 -1.4859 19.1802 
 (0.19) (5.04)*** (1.45) (0.54) (3.69)*** (0.48) (2.76)*** (3.16)*** (5.04)*** (2.83)*** (0.58) (4.04)*** 
N 230 230 230 75 75 75 117 117 117 49 49 49 
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Appendix A: ORIC Database 
ORIC International Newsflash Service is a database of over 26,000 risk events sourced from the public 
domain and transposed into ORIC’s Operational Risk Information System (ORIS). The database contains 
both qualitative and quantitative information on each risk event and includes information on the reported 
loss amount, the name of the organisation and its industry type, as well as a description of the event, 
including the category of operational risk (See Figure 1 for an example of how an operational risk event is 
reported in the ORIC database). 
The public data on ORIS is populated by human media reviewers and automated web-trawlers that are 
programmed to look for operational risk stories and events from around the world. Institutional members 
of the ORIC International private database service may also include loss events that they have found. The 
database is updated daily. As is the case with all information in the public domain the information that is 
collected is only as good as what has been released or discovered, but in most cases a loss amount is 
provided, along with the organisation and its industry sector. 
Compared with other operational loss databases used in the literature, the ORIC data is very similar to 
the ALGO OpData™ (De Fontnouvelle and Perry, 2005; Cummins et al., 2006; Micocci et al., 2009; 
Fiordelisi et al., 2013; Fiordelisi et al., 2014) and the ALGO First™ database (De Fontnouvelle and Perry, 
2005; Gillet et al., 2010) used by much of the past research on operational and reputational risks, but offers 
a more comprehensive dataset (as of March 2018, ORIC has over 26,000 risk events and ALGO First™, 
now owned by IBM, has over 15,000 risk loss events26). In addition, the ÖffSchOR database provided by 
the Association of German Public Sector Banks (Bundesverband offentlicher Banken, VOB) used by Sturm 
(2013 a & b) contains around 2,000 risk loss events27. Hence, ORIC has enabled us to extract the largest 
sample size possible for the study period 2010 – 2014. 
One limitation of the ORIC database is that it covers very few operational risk events before 2010, thus 
not allowing to inspect market reactions to operational risk announcements before and during the global 
financial crisis. Another limitation (although it is shared with some other proprietary operational risk 
databases) is that ORIC only collects media news in English. 
  
                                                          
26 IBM Algo FIRST: https://www.ibm.com/uk-en/marketplace/ibm-algo-first [Accessed 31/03/2018]. 
27 Öffentliche Schadenfälle Oprisk (ÖffSchOR): https://www.voeb-service.de/informationsdienste/oeffschor/ 
[Accessed 31/03/2018]. 
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Figure 1: An Example of an Operational Risk Event as Reported in the ORIC Database 
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Appendix B: Variables Description 
Variable Name Definition Data Source(s) 
CAR (x,z) Cumulative abnormal stock return in the event window (x,z) = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖=𝑥𝑥 , where  𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  Estimation window of the 
normal stock return is 250 trading days ending one calendar month before the announcement date. Estimation 
model is single-factor market model. Original stock prices are measured in U.S. dollar. The variable is measured 
as a percentage (%). 
DataStream 
RCAR (x,z) Reputational return in the event window (x,z) = Cumulative abnormal stock return + |(Disclosed operational loss 
amount / Market value of the loss firm two calendar weeks before the announcement date)|. The variable is 
measured as a percentage (%). 
- DataStream 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
CASC (x,z) Cumulative abnormal CDS spread change in the event window (x,z) = ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖=𝑥𝑥 , 
where  𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 − 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖−1) −(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 − 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖−1). The variable is measured in basis points (bps) for a five-year duration 
(modified modified structure). 
DataStream 
 
Net Negative Tone ((Negative Words – Positive Words) / Total Financial Sentiment Words) * 100 - Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Uncertainty Tone (Uncertainty Words / Total Financial Sentiment Words) * 100 - Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Litigious Tone (Litigious Words / Total Financial Sentiment Words) * 100 - Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Loss Amount Disclosure Dum 1 if the operational loss amount is disclosed; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Firm Recognition Dum 1 if the operational risk event is recognized by the loss firm; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Regulatory Announcement Dum 1 if the operational risk event is announced by a regulatory body; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Settlement Dum 1 if the operational risk event is settled; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Different Country Dum 1 is the operational risk event takes place in a country different from the loss firm headquarters’ country; 0 
otherwise 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Top Figures Dum 1 if the operational risk event directly involves one or more of the board directors or chief executives; 0 otherwise  - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
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Fraud Dum 1 if the operational risk event is classified as internal fraud or external fraud; 0 otherwise - ORIC 
- LexisNexis 
Basel Business Line Dum 1 if the operational risk event is classified under one of the eight Basel II business lines: Corporate Finance, 
Trading and Sales, Retail Banking, Commercial Banking, Payment and Settlement, Agency Services, Asset 
Management, Retail Brokerage; 0 otherwise 
- ORIC 
- LexisNexis  
FT & WSJ Dum 1 if the operational risk event is featured in The Financial Times or The Wall Street Journal; 0 otherwise LexisNexis 
Number of News Articles Number of news articles that feature the operational risk event LexisNexis 
Analyst Coverage Number of equity analysts following the firm (i.e. issuing EPS estimates) Bloomberg 
Credit Rating S&P long-term local issuer credit rating. It is measured in an ascending numerical scale ranging from AAA=1 to 
D or SD = 22 
Bloomberg 
 StDev Ret Standard deviation of daily stock returns for one trading year ending one calendar month before the 
announcement date (Decimals) 
DataStream 
Beta Monthly stock’s Beta (measured at the end of calendar month preceding the announcement date) DataStream 
Float% The percentage of outstanding shares available to ordinary shareholders two calendar weeks before the 
announcement date 
DataStream 
Ln(Volume) The natural logarithm of the number of shares traded for the stock (in thousands) two calendar weeks before the 
announcement date 
DataStream 
Ln(Total Assets) Natural logarithm of total assets (in millions of U.S. dollar) measured at the end of calendar quarter preceding the 
announcement date 
DataStream 
ROA Return on assets (%) DataStream 
Leverage Long-term debt / Shareholders’ equity (Decimals)  DataStream 
Market to Book Ratio Market value of equity / Book value of equity (Decimals) DataStream 
GDP Per Capita GDP per capita (in thousand U.S. dollar) World Bank 
